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For my parents,
my bounders and my creators,
who have kept the delicate balance

[T]he fundamental coerciveness of society lies not in its
machineries of social control, but in its power to constitute
and to impose itself as reality.
Peter Berger, The Sacred canopy
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FIRST WORDS

As Peter Berger said, the definition of reality represents a
society's most powerful form of control, its cognitive
straitjacket on creativity.

As a member of American culture who

has more often than not found himself thrown up against the walls
of reality by the cultural police, I have long found what we call
reality fascinating.

I remember when, after withdrawing from

college after my freshman year, I began to hear dire warnings
about the 'real world'.

A moment away from the safety net of

academia, it seemed, and I was about to be plunged into the dark
abyss of harshness, the teeth-flashing pit of a dog-eat-dog
world.
It wasn't that way, of course.

I found things I liked

doing, and none of them were located in that dark pit.

But it

seemed to me that whatever lifestyle I chose, I never entered
that mythical 'real world'.

I moved to Israel and lived on a

kibbutz, which was acceptable as a digression, but not a way of
life.

Somehow it just didn't count to the people around me as

'real life'.

I took up acting, working as part of a company in

which people spent their lives, but it too failed to measure up
to 'real life'.

I worked with my parents in their small

pharmacy, but still, I was miles away from the 'real world'.
When I returned to academia, the warnings changed.

I'd

better plan for that time not too far away, that childhood's end,
that entrance into the real world.

But I started to express a

desire to become an academic, to make my life in the world of
1

universities.

And once again, in my neck of the woods, eyebrows

raised in the face of my obstinate refusal to finally become a
part of the real world.
Personally, I think everything I've done is real, and my
confidence in that belief provided the first push towards this
thesis.

Why, I wondered, do we limit what we call 'real'?

What

do we mean by 'real' in the first place?
I still don't know, but I think I've made a start, and the
start has been as valuable for me emotionally as it has
intellectually.

I was faced with the cultural cops, our notion

of reality, and they came down hard.

But as Milton Yinger has

observed, victor Turner has inferred and Neil Postman has
demanded, good education is itself a subversive activity, the
analysis and deconstruction of our own social codes and beliefs.
That insurrection has given me an emotional base from which to
withstand the repressive forces.
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This is my first attack.

INTRODUCTION: CHARTING THE JOURNEY
You have in your hands a thing: a discrete, bounded entity.
You see paper, which you identify as a thing, and you see some
concept,

'thesis',less directly than paper, but still as a

thing.
But as much as you have a thing, you engage in a process,
the interaction of my mind and yours, a time-delayed
conversation.

A thesis (or article or book) performs the role of

an intellectual launching pad, a catalyst for thought.

Both

'realities', the slices of a dead tree and the processengagement, confront you through experience.
And yet, as Americans we are more likely to think of even
the process elements of a thesis as a thing: a bounded, complete
set of thoughts ready for dissection.
(

\

Unless reminded, we allow

the process to slip into the background.

We forget the

engagement and concentrate on the analysis.

I call this paper

"Journeying Towards America" to emphasize what we sometimes
forget: that any written work is both a journey shared and a
place reached, a process of exploring the intricacies of the
foreign terrain, and a recounting of the things found there.
In this case, the foreign terrain is not so foreign.

I take

the anthropological col lander to our own soup, and sift through
our own vegetables.

The advantage in all this intimacy, of

course, is that it's your soup too.

You know what I'm not even

sifting, what I didn't see at the bottom of the pot and what I did.
My primary vegetable, the big cheese passing through my
autoanthropological grater, is epistemology, or the way of seeing
and making sense out of the world.
3

I submit that our tendency to

see this thesis as more of a thing than a process ties into a
distinctly American (or Western) way of seeing the world.

Our

blind spot for process, this half-amnesia of the intellect,
clusters around our notion of reality.

Much of the world, I aim

to prove, we see through the filter of thinghood, through the
lens of boundaries and borders, physicality and separateness.
That thinking, a way of looking at the world I have tagged
'thing-epistemology', has been associated through the long march
of history as 'Aristotelian' thinking.

Set up against it by our

duality-loving minds has generally been something called
'Galilean' thought, a means of understanding that I call
'process-epistemology'.
America, of course, and Americans in particular, do not
locate themselves entirely within an Aristotelian world.
i.

Elements of process-thinking occasionally seep in, and some
groups within American society base their philosophic systems on
process, not thing.

'America'

(whatever that means) represents a

mixed system, a melting pot that separates, a constellation of
opposites tugging at each other across a self-created divide.
More often than not, Aristotle wins that tug-of-war, and reality
appears to us as a thing.
A thing is, by definition, something bounded, something
discrete.

The world presents itself as an undifferentiated

stream; it is we who cut and carve, who name, bound and define.
"This is a man," we say, including saliva in the mouth but
excluding that just spit our, drawing our man-line around the
scab but between the foot and the sock, counting a transplanted
kidney but not a hairpiece.

"This is a foot," we say, meaning it

is not an arm, a leg or a chin, although the four may form one

integrated body.

"It ends here," we say, "and isn't the same as

this," 'this' being a second thing.
Anything that bounds must exclude.

As Kenneth Burke once

said, a way of seeing is a way of not seeing.

If I say "this is

a man" the way I did above, then I leave out spit, sock and
hairpiece.

If I say it in a different way, I could leave out

skin, soul and history.

spit, sock and hairpiece seem

reasonable exclusions to make because they lie outside our
culture'sl definition of a man; to leave out skin or soul, which
our culture doesn't, seems absurd.
But not absurd to all.

A culture may leave spit in its

definition of a man, or it may leave soul out.

The point is not

to ask whether spit or soul should be included in the definition
of a man, just to note that different cultures count different

(

things.

And by counting different things, they leave others out.

The whole process of defining, of cutting and carving,
necessarily excludes some concepts and includes some others ..
That is the essence of thingness.
To most of my (American) readers, this must seem pure
sophistry.
a thing.

Of course reality is a thing, as much as anything is
But that doesn't mean we think it's a small thing, a

little picture window on a world obscured by the white walls of
II have drawn my notion of culture, here and following, from the
works of Geertz and Witherspoon, particularly "Thick Description"
and Language and Art in the Navajo Universe.

5

our cultural living room.

It's a thing, but it's our concept for

the whole thing, the big thing, the real thing.
And that seems plausible.
autoanthropology.

Such is the danger with

As one astute observer once remarked, the more

anthropologists say about America, the less we trust what they
say about Samoa.

Maybe we distrust what we/they say because its

revelations directly confront our common sense, that variegated
last-ditch cultural system on which we so often base our actions.
If the second is true, then the distrust, growing out of
discomfort, must be seen as a positive indicator of progress, a
signpost reading "DANGER! CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS CHALLENGED."
Since challenging cultural assumptions (or at least pointing them
out) is the primary business of autoanthropology, we're on the
right road.
But doubting anthropology in your own backyard may come from
boredom as much as i t comes from distrust.

Discussing American

conceptions of reality in terms of thinghood just doesn't seem
like anything special, certainly nothing to spend a hundred pages
on.

But what seems most evident may seem so because most rooted,

and what is most rooted may be so because most basic.

Bateson

echoes the teachings of Zen Buddhism in saying
[T]hat which we know best is that of which we are least
conscious, i.e., that the process of habit formation is a
sinking of knowledge down to less conscious and more archaic
levels. the unconscious contains not only the painful
matters which consciousness prefers to not inspect, but also
many matters which are so familiar that we do not need to
inspect them.
(1972:141, my emphasis)
Inspecting familiar matters from an unfamiliar perspective isjust what I'm after: the analysis of epistemology--our way of
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seeing and understanding the world--that most basic cultural grid.
What is most basic, then, may be one of those Witherspoon ian
cultural keys, central clues to the understanding of a culture.
Such is the case, I think, with 'reality is a thing'.
obvious because it is:

It seems

obvious, but crucial.

* * *
That diffent cultures define reality in different terms
leads not only to the question of how America defines it, but
also to the question of where cultures get their ideas of
reality.

The terrain here, the connection between reality and a

culture's conceptions of it, can be tricky.

Should I frame the

question as "Which cultural conception, or which synthesis of
varying conceptions, comes closest to depicting the world as it
is?"

If I do, I must join the philosophers.

As I'll show later,

the phrasing of that question makes it likely that only
philosophers from certain cultures would ask it at all.

Phrasing

the question like that has also allows philosophically-minded
politicians a possible justification for imperialism, trumpeting
as they so often do the virtues of bringing the true god to the
heathens, or the only real form of freedom to the self-oppressed.
Since I claim no privileged access to truth, I will avoid
that phrasing entirely.

As close as ethnophilosophy and the

sociology of knowledge may sometimes come to philosophy, my own
best interests lie in drawing the line firmly.

Philosophy aims,

like some Cortez of knowledge, to find the fountain of truth;
anthropology contents itself with charting the paths of those

varied cultures that seek it, and then documenting in fine detail
7

the millions of places where it has been found. 2

The temptation

to pick the biggest fountain or the brightest or the most
beautiful and call it the only one is a temptation that
philosophical anthropologists must always fight. 3
HOw, then, should I frame the question of the connection
between reality and cultural conceptions of it?

As I said at the

beginning, cultures differ in their understandings of the
undifferentiated stream that is the world.

That led into a

discussion of bounding, of cutting and carving.

But cutting and

carving can be seen as creating as easily as they can be seen as
bounding.

A wood sculptor could be said to be constructing

boundaries, but it could just as easily be said (and more often
is) that she creates.

So too with a culture's view of reality;

reality is on one hand a bounding of the world that is, on the
other a new creation.

Neither tag, bounder or creator, needs to

exclude the other, and something can be learned by looking at the
sculptor in both lights.

What we are dealing with in the second

light is the cultural creation of reality, or as Berger and
Luckmann once put it, "the social construction of reality."

2Many trends in modern science,
physics, indicate that there is
locate it. Buddhism, Hinduism,
science and neurophysiology all

including especially quantum
no absolute truth except where we
information theory, cognitive
agree to at least some extent.

3 p icking the most beautiful fountain seems to depend in no small
way on which fountain you grew up under; which cascade of water
has shed its drops on you for years. And the choice also seems
not uninfluenced by your compelling motive in looking at the
other fountain at all:
is it to consider purchase or capture, to
admire or self-affirm by deprecation of a rival, or to create a
glorious 'other' from which to set yourself and your fountain
apart.
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The very notion of a culturally-created reality brings bile
to the mouths of most American philosophers. 4

G.E.Moore,

proving the reality of the external world by holding up one
hand and saying here is a physical object and then holding
up the other and saying here is another
is, as Clifford Geertz has noted, "the epitomizing image of a
very large part of recent philosophy" (1983:77).

More broadly,

culturally-created reality as a concept rubs most Americans,
philosophers or not, the wrong way.

"Look, reality just is,"

you're likely to hear when you ask an American if culture creates
reality.

Reality is undeliberated on.

It is assumed, or even

more directly, un-assumed, for the very act of assumption halfimplies a fleeting recognition of the assuming.

In its taken-for-grantedness, the acceptance of reality

(

parallels common sense.

As Geertz remarks,

it is an inherent characteristic of common-sense thought
precisely to deny [that it is a relatively organized body of
considered thought] and to affirm that its tenets are
immediate deliverances of experience, not deliberated
reflections upon i t ... common sense rests its [case] on the
assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a
nurshell. The world is its authority.
(1983:75)
Whether common sense models its unassumednes on the unassumedness
of reality or the unassumedness of reality grows from common
sense's 'no questions' approach, the two styles converge.

Just

as common sense is an organized cultural system masquerading as
direct experience, our dominant definition of reality claims to
be reality itself.

4w
-no are, of course, part of the culture under study, the one
that dictates (too strong a word?) objective truth.
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Of course not all of our culture denies the cultural
createdness of reality.

Quantum physicists, for instance, often

find themselves defending the human createdness of reality
against less-than-accepting philosophers and theologians,
although they do so without recourse to the word 'culture'.
Theater, for its part, often questions the taken-for-grantedness
of reality, as do poetry, science fiction, and a wide crosssection of the arts.

Much of academia also embraces the idea of

a culturally- (or humanly-) created reality, from deconstructing
literary theorists to symbol-wielding neurophysiologists.

As

Chapter 4 will show, this belief in the cultural creation of
reality may represent the core of the process-epistemology, the
organizing principle and common bond around which many of
America's counterepistemologies collect.

* * *
But why should we assume the opinion of the second group,
the actors and artists, physicists and poets, when it comes to
the question of the cultural creation of reality?

Why not accept

what I paint to be the dominant American picture, the opposition
to the notion of a culturally-created reality?
The answer lies in our own bodies.

As Emerson once said,

overstating, "The whole of nature is a metaphor of the human
mind."

A large body of literature has grown up around humanity's

seeming need for external creations.

As Peter Berger puts it,

"Human being is externalizing in its essence and from the
beginning" (1967:4).

The need for externalization, noted by

Spencer, Hegel and Marx, has recently been attributed to human
physiology (Gehlen, Plessner, Buytendijk, Portmann, Lapassade,
10

(

cited in Berger).

Berger summarizes the field by saying

essential steps in the process of 'finishing' man's
development, which have already taken place in the foetal
period for the higher mammals, occur in the first year after
birth in the case of man. That is, the biological process
of 'becoming man' occurs at a time when the human infant is
in interaction with an extra-organismic environment ... thus a
biological foundation to the process of 'becoming man'
occurs at a time when the human infant is in interaction
with an extra-organismic environhment ... thus a biological
foundation to the process of 'becoming man' in the sense of
developing personality and appropriating culture. The
latter developments are not somehow superimposed as alien
mutations upon the biological development of man, but they
are grounded in it.
(1967:4-5)
culture does not wait for biology to develop, as the
Enlightenment view held.
basic.

The process of externalization is

Learning or creating a symbolic code for the external

world, that first and ongoing step of culture, binds itself
inextricably to physical development.

To call one the real

person and the other costume, one cake and the other icing, is to
fly in the face of the fact that they are everywhere, always
bound together.

There is no cultureless human, just as there is

no bodiless human.

The true noble savage, free from culture and

alone in the world with its instincts, could exist no more
readily than the discorporate mind, patterning symbols in a world
of which it is, but is not, a part.

The one is Beast, the second

God, but only bound are they Human.
Why they are bound relates directly to the unfinished nature
of the human instinctual structure.

Geertz, in an essay titled

"The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man",
puts the matter this way:
The behavior patterns or ~ower animals are, at least to a
much greater extent, given to them with their physical
structure; genetic sources of information order their
11

actions within much narrower ranges of variation, the
narrower and more thoroughgoing the lower the animal.
For
man, what are innately given are the extremely general
response capacities ... [which] leave it much less precisely
regulated.
(1973: 46)
Or, as Berger puts it somewhat more succinctly,
man's instinctual structure at birth is both
underspecialized and undirected towards a species-specific
environment ... [the human] world must be fashioned by man's
own activity ... Man must make a world for himself.
(1967:5)
Human physiology, then, at least partially explains the human
necessity of externalized symbolization.

The human instinctual

structure and the link between body and mind point the way
towards a necessary creation of reality.
What happens in our bodies also happened in our history: the
story of human development is a story of body and symbol standing
together.

(

Culture, represented archaeologically by tools, began

at least a million years before Homo sapiens developed.

Culture,

that means, didn't just happen after we stopped evolving.

It

happened while we were developing, and helped determine that
development.

Culture and nature grew up together, each affecting

the other.
Understood cybernetically, the ramifications of so simple a
fact are enormous.

Geertz again:

As culture, step by infinitesimal step, accumulated and
developed, a selective advantage was given to those
individuals in the population most able to take advantage of
it ... until what had been a small-brained, protohuman
Australopithecus became the large-brained fully human Homo
sapiens. Between the cultural pattern, the body, and the
brain, a positive feedback system was created in which each
shaped the progress of the other.
(1973:48)
As Bateson says, "it is the context which evolves" (1967:154), not
one element (here culture) within a seemingly fixed context.
Bateson's classic ecological example serves as an apt
12

analogy: Eohippus didn't just react to the grassy plains to
become a horse; the plains also developed turf as a response to
the changing ungulates.
horse and turf together.

The context, the full ecology, evolves,
So with the human being: the context--

the whole--changes as a result of dynamic feedback changes, not
one variable (culture) reacting to a finished physiological
context.
Externalization, then, is biologically rooted in both the
species and the individual, and the symbolic universe we create
is as vital to humanity in general and humans in particular as
the physical world we inhabit. 5

Or, to be more accurate, the

symbolic and the physical make up one world, the real world, and
it is that world which is vital.

* * *

(

Accepting the cultural createdness of reality doesn't
necessarily lead to accepting the presence of multiple views of
reality.
cultures.

You can accept culture, that is, without accepting
Following this logic, you would accept the brain/body

connection and the idea of a cybernetic, contextually inseparable
development.

But then you'd take your shot:

just as the child,

universally, emerges into this world unfinished, and just as Homo
sapiens, uniformly, developed simultaneously in brain 'and body,
we should expect a universal and uniform culture, an essentially

5 0ur very perception of the physical world is itself symbolic;
i.e., our brains do not directly experience anything; our sensory
nerves send signals (symbols) to our brains which our brains
interpret as real.
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singular way of looking at reality.6

Minor changes may occur, a

different language here, a different costume there.

But in the

end, like unfinished babies who may vary from child to child but
share their essential humanity, all cultures understand reality
in the same terms.

As we developed as a species, as our culture

patterned our physiological development, as we selected
ourselves, so to speak, one view of reality developed to match
the single species. 7
The simplest answer to this view is that the so-called
'minor changes' are not minor at all; that language and costume
(to use the two named above) are themselves part of a symbolic
universe that defines the culture, not evanescent epiphenomena
that change like leaves in autumn, yet leave the tree unmoved.
The way to prove this is detailed comparative ethnography, cross-

(

cultural thick description aimed at debunking the myth of
6Suppose my assumptions are wrong and this argument proves
correct? Suppose contemporary philosophers like Bloom (1987) are
right, that my base assumption of differing cultural views of
reality shows false? What I am I left with then--just another
hundred pages wasted on a bad paradigm? something else, I think.
For if I explain some of the essentials of the American view of
reality and it is ultimately proven that there is no
distinctively American view of reality, that everyone views it
the same way, then I will have explained some of the qualities of
the universal understanding of reality, or perhaps of reality
itself.
It's here that Bloom and his ilk should be most careful. If
philosophy (or anthropology itself) should ultimately deny the
existence or significance of basic cultural differences, then the
anthropologist's role increases, not decreases, in significance.
A specific understanding of American notions of reality becomes a
general understanding of human notions of reality, and
ethnophilosophy becomes philosophy.
7 Th is view isn't just a derivative of the mainstream's thingepistemology. Timothy Leary, for instance, believes that culture
can be reduced to our biological cornmonalities--that culture is
a patterning developed from our DNA.
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universalism, the maxim that we are, after all, just human
beings.

Chapter 3 will provide the cross-cultural evidence,

drawn mainly from contemporary Hopi and Navaho cultures and older
accounts of Dravidian and Chasidic cultures. 8

Chapter 4 will,

similarly, provide the inside evidence, examples of American
groups whose epistemologies counter our own.

* * *
Once we've passed through some of the terrain, begun our
journeying towards America, where do we go?

Chapter 2 will have

brought us to the fortified castle of this realm, Chapter 3 will
have put that castle in a comparative context, other castles in
other valleys, and Chapter 4 will have shown the revolutionaries
and malcontents: the quiet monks and palace radicals, cloistered
women and political peasants.
As every good tourist knows, once you've seen the sights get
out of the carriage and meet the people.

See how they actually

live their local lives, whether the king picks potatoes among the
peasants, whether the monks visit the castle.

Chapter 5 brings

us to that stage of the journey, what anthropology has come to
call the 'practice' approach, locals living their lives.
As every good tourist will also tell you, you can't trust a
8My cross-cultural evidence is thin, not thick. Since none of my
cross-cultural evidence is firsthand, I must depend mainly on
ethnographies written from other than an ethnophilosophical
perspective (with the exception of Witherspoon).
I am forced to
interpret interpretations, to translate translations, to comment
on commentaries. My whole process remains meta, a step removed.
My evidence of cQunterepistemologies in America, to the contrarJ,
is based mainly on firsthand experience and knowledge.

15

tourist.

What they say about dinner on the Seine with Beckett or

the Tuilleries in Spring comes not only from their adventures,
but also from their preconceptions.

If I hate absurdism I

probably didn't enjoy dinner, and if Miro on Chicago concrete is
my cup of tea, the Tuilleries probably fell flat.

Every tourist

adventure, every foray into the field for enjoyment or analysis,
is itself an interaction between the tourist and the land, the
observer and the observed.
I'll try, of course, to paint a fair picture of this land,
American epistemology.

But all along the way I will acknowledge

that I do paint, that what you see is not the land itself, but my
portrait of it.
No painting can ever portray the fullness of what is.

Great

art merely shows some of it in a new way, starts the viewer off
on a journey of his own.

16

"Things are in the saddle and ride mankind."
Emerson

CHAPTER 2: THING CASTLE
Most students of human communication acknowledge a
connection between language and the thought process (Chomsky,
Gumperz and Hymes, Sapir, Schneider, spradley, Turner, Tyler).
Language, then, can serve as a clue to thought processes.

Broad

patterns of speaking--whether they be strategies for bounding,
classificatory schemes (Witherspoon), myths (Levi-Strauss),
idioms or joke forms (Basso)--reveal much of the ways in which a
culture or a person structures thought.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have exposed one of the most
important patterning forms of human speech: the metaphorical
!

system.

In Metaphors We Live By, they assert:

!
\

most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature •.. metaphor is not just a matter
of language ... human thought processes are
largely metaphorical ... Metaphors as linguistic
expressions are possible precisely because there
are metaphors in a person's conceptual system (4-6).
Arguing, for example, is understood in terms of war, and as a
result we use phrases like attacking a position an indefensible
strategy, a demolished point, to win an argument, to gain ground,
he shot down my arguments, etc.

We not only use many war terms

to describe arguments, but we actually win or lose them, we see
our co-arguer as an opponent, we actually gain ground, take a new
line of attack.

In short, "the things we do in arguing are

partially structured by the concept of war"(p.4).

The

metaphorical concept structures both what we do (here arguing)
and how we understand what we are doing (here talking about
17

arguing) .
Furthermore, the metaphorical systems within a culture are
both internally and externally consistent.

Each metaphorical

system exhibits internal 'systematicity', i.e., it can't be that
"I'm feeling up" means I'm happy and "My spirits rose" means I'm
sad, because the upward direction must always be metaphorically
associated with happiness (pp.7-18).
entails, so that

II

Across systems,

'coherence'

[t]he most fundamental values in a culture will

be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most
fundamental concepts in the culture" as well as with the other
metaphorical systems (p.22).

In other words, it's no coincidence

that MORE, GOOD, HIGH STATUS, and THE FUTURE are all up.

* * *
(

In most of American English, reality is conceived of as a
thing.

The metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING presents

itself most directly in idiomatic expressions such as 'out of
touch with reality',
reality'.

'a firm grasp on reality', and 'grounded in

Reality is something you can touch or something that

something else can be grounded in. Something you can touch.

Even

our generic term for referring to an as yet unnamed--'something'-is structured in terms of thinghood.
If reality isn't something, it's nothing; in either case, a
thing.

One of our most basic dichotomies is something/nothing,

and even if a word isn't some thing, it must be conceived of as
no thing.

Either way, conceptualization occurs in terms of

thinghood.
Our linguistic semantics rest on the same fundamental

18

thingness.

The English language is noun-heavy, relying primarily

on words that follow a fundamentally non-active pattern.

Whorf

has posited that the semantic structure of a language may pattern
the thoughts of the cultural members.

Hopi language, for

instance, resides primarily in process, emphasizing verb-forms
and strongly de-emphasizing nouns.

Most 'nouns', for instance,

are simply static forms of the verbs.

Following Whorf's logic for

Americans, we would expect to find an emphasis on the category of
'thing', indeed the very organizing symbol we are pursuing. l

Whorf's hypothesis, though, is rarely accepted in the
extreme sense.

Actors are understood to have far more control

over their own lives, and epistemologies vary widely within and
across grammatical systems.

(

Whorf's hypothesis, then, is best

looked at as a single piece of evidence, not a totalizing
conclusion that summarizes a culture's epistemology.
Mathematics here parallels grammar.

In geometry, a clear

distinction is made between a slope of zero and no slope, as in
math in general zero and the null set are clearly differentiated.
within the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system, zero (or
nothing) is clearly a thing, so a second concept of emptiness is
created, an emptiness lacking even zero.
Americans themselves associate reality with thingness.

IOn a radically Whorfian level, it could be argued that my
process/product dichotomy derives from the English verb/noun
dichotomy, which itself is not based in nature or some objective
reality.
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Interviews I conducted between May and October of 1987 clearly
support the metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING.

Ranking five

jobs in terms of 'realness', respondents almost always considered
construction work the most real and travel agent or receptionist
the least real.

The following represents a rough breakdown:

:k Most Real

Job
receptionist
travel agent
construction
retail sales
cook

o
o

80
5

15

:k Least Real
35

45

o

10
10
(n=20; llF ,9M)·

The order of declining realness--construction work, cook, retail
sales, receptionist, travel agent--came out as I expected; the
hierarchy is directly related to REALITY IS A THING.

Consonant

with the metaphorical system, the jobs most connected with things
(

are considered most real and those least connected with things
are considered least real.

The construction worker makes things;

the cook changes some things into other things; the retail
salesperson simply handles things in order to sell them; the
receptionist and the travel agent are not involved with 'things',
they merely facilitate people being able to get to things.
My understandings are trustworthy only if coupled with
similar understandings by natives.

Other factors could have

played a significant role in the ranking of the jobs,
particularly matters of gender and sector (service vs.
manufacturing).

Construction work, for example, could be more

highly ranked because traditionally male, and office receiving
may be devalued because traditionally female.
Informants themselves, however, rarely acknowledged issues
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of gender or social class.

Much more often, real work was

considered physical work, particularly physical work including
hands.

One woman, for instance, in ranking sculpting more real

than teaching English, explained: "I guess I think if you're
doing something with your hands ... if you're making something,
forming something," then your job is more real than if you're
involved in something "obscure" like teaching English.

A second

woman insisted that a nurse's job is more real than a
translator's, saying that "a nurse does tangible things, a
translator is just like a conduit ... [things just go through
them] ... they're not creating anything of their own."
The first woman insisted that creativity was an important
gauge of realness, consistently ranking doctor higher than
accountant, social organizer, and others.

But when asked to

compare ditch digging and organizing programs at a nursing home,
she quickly chose ditch digging as the most real, forcing herself
to reexamine and ultimately reject her use of 'creativity' as a
gauge of realness.

She restructured her formula to include

utility, asking questions like where the ditch digger was
digging, and determined that usefulness to society was of prime
significance.

Usefulness, she said, could be either mental or

physical, and therefore a translator was as real as a nurse.

But

when asked whether, as a whole, the body or the mind (i.e.,
mental or physical processes) was more real, she didn't hesitate:
[T]he body has like got a grip, the body's
more real than the mind ... because the mind
like keeps changing ... [the body's] always
the same basically.
It wasn't surprising, then, that in her final responses, the
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ranking of the five jobs in the table above, she did not justify
\

her choice of construction worker by reference to creativity or
utility.

Instead, she said it is most real "because it's more

tangible."
Along with 'physical',
word in the interviews.

'tangible' proved quite a popular

I asked informants which of the four

classic Aristotelian elements--air, earth, fire and water--they
considered most and least real, and received roughly this
distribution:
~

Element
Air
Earth
Fire
Water

Most Real

o

80
5
15

~

Least Real
60
10
20
10

Once again, the answers followed expectations of consonance with
the metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING.

Earth, the most

tangible of the four classic elements, is most associated with
reality; air, the least tangible, is considered the least real;
water, which can be touched but not held, and fire, which can be
felt but not held, both fall midway between the real and the
unreal.
The informants explanations mirrored my own.

"Least

tangible" was a phrase used often to explain the choice of air as
least real.

Similarly, earth was most often cited as most real

along with an explanation of its thingness; one respondent said
simply: "you're always standing on it, you can see it, and you
live on it."

What is most thingish is most real.

Earth as thing and air as not thing, then, directly
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correlate with earth as real and air as not real.

Many of our

uses of 'ethereal' and similar words reveal further evidence for
the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system.

Mental health, for

example, a gauge of connectedness to reality, is filled with
phrases from the earth/air dichotomy.
eccentric are 'airy',

The disturbed and

'flighty', or just 'out of touch', whereas

normal people are 'grounded' or 'down to earth'.
Seen in this light, it is no coincidence that fairies and
sprites are 'ethereal' and that witches fly through the air.
farther you go from reality, the farther you go from thing.

The
And

structured in terms of the air/earth conventional metaphor
system, the farther you go from thing, the farther you go from
earth.

Those who are conceived of as far from reality--mystics,

the insane, dreamers--are associated with air, the least thingish
of the classic elements.

Normal people--down to earth folks like

you and me--live our lives on the ground, on this earth, that
most thingish of things.
The American kinship systems gives further credence to the
REALITY IS A THING system.

As Schneider (1968) points out,

Americans understand kinship as an entirely biogenetic concept.
Furthermore, that biogenetic relationship is permanent,
regardless of emotional faIlings-out or personal disagreements:
The relationship which is 'real' or 'true' or 'blood'
or by 'birth' can never be severed, whatever its legal
position ... It is culturally defined as being an objective
fact of nature....
(1968:24)
'Blood', which is conceived of as a 'thing'

(p.24), is closely

connected with the notion of a 'real' relationship:
Consider the step-, -in-law, and foster relatives. The
fundamental fact about these relatives is that they have the
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role of close relatives without, as informants put it, being
'real or blood relatives.' A step-mother is a mother who is
not a 'real' mother, but the person who is now the father's
wife. A father-in-law is a father who is not Ego's own
father, but his spouse's father. And a foster son is not
one's own or real son, but someone whom one is caring for as
a son.
Clearly 'thing', manifested here as blood, and 'real' share a close
relationship in American cUlture. 2

* * *
Etymology gives further evidence of the solidity of the
metaphor system REALITY IS A THING in American English.

victor

Turner comments on the value of etymological evidence in deriving
current meaning:

(

By analogy with geology, archaeology, and depth psychology,
it may be possible to regard the etymology of key terms in
major languages as a many-leveled system whose strata are
composed of successively deposited layers of historical
'experience'. Etymology is, after all, a mode of 'restoring
the past', a form of linguistic 'self-reflexivity'. The
many-leveled or 'laminated' geological crust of the earth is
still 'alive' (think of the Mt. st. Helen's eruption); even
more so is the human 'mind' or 'psyche', with its conscious,
pre-conscious, and unconscious levels, each subdivided into
layers or bands laid down by repeated dramatic or
'traumatizing experiences'. Neurobiologists of the central
nervous system recognize surviving 'archaic' structures in
the brain, forebrain, and autonomic systems, which continue
to interact with the neocortex. Similarly, a modern word's
past 'senses' have influenced its present penumbra of
meaning.
(1982:16-17)
The word 'reality' derives from the Latin root 'res',
meaning 'thing'.

The history of the word in English builds on

2The American fascination with sociobiology may be explained to
some extent by this blood-as-real folk category, and more broadly
by the thing-as-real system.
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the thinghood of reality.

The Oxford English Dictionary

(1961:309) lists as synonyms "In thing, in reality, really,
actually (opposed to in name= nominally)".3

Thing equals reality.

One of the crudest examples of this equation survives today in
the term 'real estate'.

Executors of wills, finding it necessary

to distinguish between the material aspects of an estate and the
non-material ones (such as title), chose to affix the word 'real'
to the material ones.

Real estate today applies to that most

thingish (and as with Aristotelian elements--groundish) of
things: land.
But the O.E.D. definition reveals more than

quaint

survivals and further evidence of the rootedness of the
metaphorical system; i t also shows the inherent metaphysical bias
of the system.
opposition.

The definition sets 'in thing' and 'in name' in

It says earlier that a thing is "That which is

signified, as distinguished from a word, symbol, or idea by which
it is represented; the actual being or entity as opposed to a
symbol of it"(309).

By assuming a distinction between signifier

and signified, the definition ties itself into an objectivist
account of the universe.

In the metaphorical system REALITY IS A

3The use of the Oxford English Dictionary as an etymological
source may bring questions about the distinctive Americanness of
this system to the fore.
The distinction between American
epistemology and some broader culture group (Western, Modern,
SAE, Indo-European) is a difficult distinction to make.
Obviously many similarities exist from American to Britain or
Germany or even France, and those similarities may include
elements of a shared epistemology. Nevertheless, as I am
confined by limitations of knowledge, resources, time and space,
I have chosen to focus on the culture which for me is most
accessible, the one I know best. For that reason my units of
analysis derive mainly from America, although an occasional
citation from the authoritative O.E.D. may mix things up a bit.
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THING, then, America and Americans must view reality within an
objectivist framework. 4

Reality must be singular and absolute.

* * *
What are the ramifications of viewing reality as a thing in
an objectivist framework?

For one, the REALITY IS A THING

metaphor system explains the existence of ontological metaphors
in English.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980:25 et passim) do not

explain the existence of ontological metaphors in American
English; instead, they assume that "they are needed to satisfy
certain purposes that we have."
determined?

(

But on what grounds is 'need'

Need is certainly a cultural determination, and it

is likely that two Americans would feel the need for ontological
metaphors simply because they are so strong a part of everyday
speech.

The metaphors, and by extension the need, are based on

the strength of the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system in
American English, and are not necessarily universally crosscultural.
Lakoff and Johnson miss only one step in their theory of

4Any attempt to describe the objective account of the universe in
a footnote is doomed to triviality. The objective account of the
universe represents the single most respected philosophical
tradition in the west and underpins many western cultures.
Briefly, though, the objective account holds that the world is
made up of independent objects with independent properties, that
we gain knowledge by experiencing the objects and learning about
their properties and relationships. Our categories and concepts
come from the objects's inherent properties, which are aspects of
the world 'out there' as it exists.
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ontological metaphors:

the step provided by REALITY IS A THING.

Reality, by definition, includes everything, so it certainly
includes experiences such as events, actions, activities and
states.

Since reality is conceived in terms of thinghood in

American English, experiences too must be conceived of as things.
That step--the conception of experiences as things--represents
ontological metaphoricalization.
The following proof should layout clearly the process
described above:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Reality, by its American definition, includes everything.
Experiences (events, actions, activities, states and other
subjects of ontological metaphors) are real, since they
are within 'everything'.
REALITY IS A THING.
Experiences are things.

Lakoff and Johnson simply begin with number four, using

(

'necessity' as their proof.
The REALITY IS A THING metaphor system also explains the
process whereby ontological metaphors become container metaphors,
another area that Lakoff and Johnson do not fully explore.

A

container metaphor is a broad category of metaphors that
structures understanding of unbounded objects in terms of
containers.

A culture, for example, is not an easily bounded

concept, but is sometimes thought of in terms of a container, as
in "She's inside the culture" or "He's not in the mainstream."
The process by which culture becomes container is again linked to
the real/thing system.
culture is real.

Since reality encompasses all concepts,

And since reality is conceived of as a thing,

culture becomes conceived of as a thing.

A thing means a

bounded, discrete entity, and bounding entails quantification.
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Quantification, in turn, allows the determination of holding
capacity, or 'containerization'.

culture, therefore, as a thing,

becomes conceived of as a container, which someone can be
'inside' of.

The following logical progression illustrates this

process:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Reality, by definition, includes everything.
Culture is real.
REALITY IS A THING.
Culture is a thing.
A thing is, by definition, a bounded discrete entity.
Culture is a bounded, discrete entity.
Bounding is, by definition, quantification (Lakoff and
Johnson:29-30 and this paper, introduction).
Quantification allows determination of ability to hold, or
'containerization' (Lakoff and Johnson, QQ cit) .
Culture is a container. (container metaphoricalization)

REALITY IS A THING, then, not only frames reality within an
objectivist framework, but also serves as the basis for the
pervasive ontological and container metaphors in American
English.
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"The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to
answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers
that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given,
and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man
has said."
Clifford Geertz

CHAPTER 3:

OTHER CASTLES IN OTHER VALLEYS

In the last chapter I explored some of the evidence that
points toward the American understanding of reality as thing.

I

need to ask, though, whether the tendency to reify, the reliance
on a notion of objective truth, the earth/air dichotomy and other
concomitants of the REALITY IS A THING system are necessarily
American.

In other words, why assume that American epistemology

differs in any significant way from the rest of the world's?
To answer that question I appeal to the ethnographic
evidence:

the Swan Pakhtun, to give one example, consider the

occupation of 'surgeon' the lowest of all possible jobs (Lindholm
1985).

If the Swat Pakhtun based their rankings on an

epistemology similar to America's (more tangible is more real),
that would not be so.
This 'appeal to the evidence', however, is facile at best.
First, degree of reality and relative ranking are not necessarily
correlates, as the American denigration of unskilled manual labor
shows.

Second, other cultural systems that may be unrelated to

epistemology (aesthetics, ethics, etc.) could (and in fact do)
play central roles in the Swat ranking of surgeon (Lindholm
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1982:98).1

The increasing ascription of reality as a job

becomes increasingly physical, then, could operate just like
America's, but be temporarily 'outranked' by another system.
That's to say that central epistemological metaphors may operate
similarly across cultures, shaped in outward form by the local
color of particular localities.
Such an argument often holds true.

Many societies exist, no

doubt, which share epistemologies yet differ in outward form.
More importantly, though, from my point of view, some cultures do
operate with epistemologies radically different from our
thingbound one.

In some cultures, the 'minor changes', the

discrepancies from our own system that in the above explanation
represent merely 'local color', point the way toward differing
conceptions of reality.

They are themselves part of a symbolic

universe that defines the culture.

By revealing those other

epistemologies, I will be putting America back in its local
light, showing the REALITY IS A THING system as one example of a
cultural epistemology, rather than the epitomizing example of the
way to construe knowledge.
Hopi, Navajo, Chasidic and Dravidian, each in its own way
presents an interesting contrast with the dominant assumptions of
American epistemology, although each of the 'ways' builds from a
somewhat similar process-dependence.

Although the first three of

1Chapter 5 will in fact deal primarily with the conflicts between
American epistemology and other cultural systems that are worked
out in the day-to-day of the social sphere, particularly the
discrepancy between a core element of the American thingepistemology and the democratic tradition.
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these cultures have had significant contact with American culture
during the last century, I will treat each as a distinct culture,
not as counter- or sub- to the dominant American system.
Where to draw the line around a culture is as difficult as
where to draw the line around a storm.
count?

Does the eye of the storm

Is a short break between two fronts part of the storm?

What about the edges--the drizzling, the mist, the grey skies?
Yinger (1982) charts the course here: in stating that a
counterculture is a group whose norms and values "sharply
contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which
that group is a part"(p.3).

My definition of subculture will

model itself on that of counterculture: a group whose norms and
values differ enough with those of the dominant culture to be
marked as 'other'.

(

part'.

The key here is 'of which that group is a

I list Hopi and Navajo as outside American culture

because although they have responded to American culture, their
development has been molded mainly by forces internal to each.
Their adaptations have grown around what Hodge calls the
'resistant institutional core', so that changes, although
present, occur predominantly within an organic setting.

The

epistemology, in particular, has remained essentially local, not
caught in the net of America's growing hegemony.2

The cultures,

20ne might argue that although changes have occurred around a
resistant institutional core, they have occurred for so long and
to such a great extent that their effects can no longer be
considered minor.
I don't mean to refute that. The effects on
social structure, for instance, have been tremendous.
I'm simply
saying that the epistemological systems (my core concern) as they
are revealed in language, ritual and metaphysics, have not been
significantly altered in either Hopi or Navajo culture (see Whorf
and Witherspoon).
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then, exist independently, not in a part-to-whole relationship
with American culture.

This is not to say that American culture

has not played a significant and at times primary role in Hopi
and Navajo cultural change.

Simply, their epistemological

interaction is intercultural, not intracultural.

One can easily

argue, for instance, that French culture had a tremendous impact
on post-Elizabethan England (and vice-versa) without implying a
part-to-whole relationship.
Since I will concentrate on the rituals and epistemology of
pre-twentieth century Chasidus, I list Chasidic culture as
outside American culture despite the close association of the two
during the last century.

Dravidian culture, obviously, has never

had any significant contact with our own.

(

* * *
Metaphor theory anticipates the incompleteness of the
American REALITY IS A THING model.

Theorists no longer

understand metaphor as the substitution or comparison of one term
for another.

Rather, the principal and subsidiary subjects 3

interact to create a new whole.

In the example MAN IS A WOLF,

'man' and 'wolf' interact, wolf serving as a filter for man so
that
Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked
about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any
that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolfmetaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others--in
short, organizes our view of man.
(Black, 1981:75)
3Black's terms, used to emphasize the similar function--subject-rather than to claim functional discrepancies like a subjectobject division would.
Other authors use vehicle/tenor, etc.
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The focus here is on suppression and emphasis.

If REALITY IS A

THING suppresses, some elements of reality must be hidden. If
some elements of reality are hidden, the system must be
incomplete.
But that's theory.
hypothetical syllogism:

I've developed an inherently unfair
in Chapter 2 I showed a varied number of

reasons why I think that Americans think reality is thing-like,
then I tagged that tendency to associate reality and thing a
'metaphorical system';

then, having reigned the phenomenon into

my category, I made reference to the category's theory to say
that the American notion of reality is incomplete.
Clearly that's not fair.

Metaphor theory may be wrong

(I certainly haven't proved Black's theory) or metaphorical
j

systems may not exist at all.

One significant problem with

Black's metaphor theory is its inherent assumption of an
objective truth.

In the above example, for instance, it assumes

that there exists somewhere an objective, totalizing definition
of human and human traits that the subsidiary subset (here
'wolf') organizes.

This is clearly contrary to Lakoff and

Johnson's central argument of an experientialist approach to
truth, of their rejection of a shopping-list approach to an
object and its traits.

At the very least, then, using both Black

and Lakoff and Johnson creates a lack of internal consistency, a
logical unsoundness in the theory.

More importantly, though,

using Black's theory in this context leads to an unpalatable (to
me) conclusion--that reality does exist somewhere out there, and
that each culture's epistemology is (by definition) an incomplete
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metaphorical understanding of it.

That may fit my carving

analogy, but certainly not my creating one.

For me, the sculptor

is always artist, and as much as she cuts pieces off the block,
she adds to the world something new.

Finding truth is bounding

and creating.
Black's notion of incompleteness, then proves unusable in
this analysis of American notions of reality.

stripped of its

objectivist assumptions and entailments, though, metaphor theory
can be quite useful.

Just as 'human' can be organized in terms

of 'wolf', 'reality' can be understood in terms of another
concept--'thing',

'process',

'wave', whatever.

not the incompleteness, holds the key here.

The interaction,

And just as Black

shows that 'man' can be understood in terms of 'wolf' or
'vulture' or another concept, so reality can be understood in
terms of process or thing or whatever.

The importance is in the

options.

* * *
One consequence of the REALITY IS A THING system is the
subset TIME IS A THING, i.e., the reification of the notion of
time.

Whorf (1939: 240-241) points out that
English terms, like 'sky, hill, swamp,' persuade us to
regard some elusive aspect of nature's endless variety as a
distinct THING, almost like a table or chair. Thus English
and similar tongues lead us to think of the universe as a
collection of rather distinct objects and events
corresponding to words ...• We might isolate something in
nature by saying 'It is a dripping spring.' Apache erects
the statement on a verb .... The result corresponds to our
'dripping spring', but synthetically it is 'as water, or
springs, whiteness moves downward.'

Similarly, English divides actions into objects because of
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syntactical requirements.

In response to a flashing, for

instance, we say 'it flashed' or 'the light flashed', "setting up
an actor IT, or A LIGHT, to perform what we call an action,
FLASH.

But the flashing and the light are the same; there is no

thing which does something, and no doing.
stative] rehpi"(263).

Hopi says only [the

The event, flashing, is described without

reference to an object or an action.
Our tendency to treat natural entities as if they were
humanly created objects seeps into the world of time.

In English,

Whorf says,
CYCLICITY brings the response of imaginary plurals. But a
likeness of cyclicity to aggregates is not unmistakably
given by experience prior to language, or it would be found
in all languages, and it is not. (139)
American English does understand time in relation to space,
and time can be 'long' or 'short'.

Ultimately, "A 'length of

time' is envisioned as a row of similar units, like a row of
bottles"(140) .
Hopi, by contrast, does not objectify time at all.

Where

in English I would say "I stayed ten days," in Hopi I would
say "I stay until day eleven" or "I leave on day ten."

Days can

progress, but cannot be counted like objects in a group to become
an aggregate.

For the Hopis, time simply does not have that

quality.
Similarly, although we normally say 'it's summer', the Hopis
don't.

To the Hopis, time cannot be objectified and set in

relation to an object,

'it'.

Time markers in Hopi form a formal

part of speech by themselves, and cannot be used as subjects,
objects or nouns.
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One does not say 'it's a hot summer' or 'summer is hot';
summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs.
One does not say 'THIS summer,' but 'summer now' or 'summer
recently.' There is no objectification, as a region, an
extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration-feeling.
Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual
"getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a
formless item answering to our 'time.' (143)
Since the Hopi do not objectify time 'like a row of bottles',
actions do not disappear into some vast universe of lost time.
[I]t is as if the return of the day were felt as the return
of the same person, a little older but with all the
impresses of yesterday, not as "another day," Le. like an
entirely different person [as in American English]. (151)
For this reason, the Hopi see continued repetition not as a
comic or pathetic waste (as we do), but as a storing up, an
accumulation, so that positive rituals performed 'when summerphase occurs' build with those of other summer-phases and
accumulate an invisible charge that affects future events.
Final evidence of a lack of a reification of time in Hopi
culture lies in the verb tense system.

The Hopi do not have

tenses referring to past, present, or future.

In fact, the only

system of varied marking of verbs occurs in a division between
what Whorf(113) calls 'reportive',

'expective'

(which could be

translated into English at any tense) and 'nomic'
of general laws).

(the statement

Hopi divides validity; English divides time:

[T]o the Hopi there is no temporal future; there is nothing
in the subjective state corresponding to the sequences and
successions conjoined with distances and changing physical
configurations that we find in the objective state.
(62)

* * *
Hopi epistemology understands the continuing durationfeeling without recourse to a reified construct called 'time';
time is never conceived in terms of space.
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American notions of

reality as thinghood predispose the comprehension of time in
terms of space, evidenced by the aggregation of cyclicity
mentioned above by Whorf.
By contrast, traditional Jewish notions of the relationship
between time and space, particularly those notions prevalent in
the Chasidic world, envisage a reverse of the American ordering:
time is seen as dominant, more real, and space is merely "frozen
time. "
In The Sabbath, Abraham Heschel, a Jewish philosophertheologian, argues that Judaism molds itself predominantly in
terms of time, a fact indicated by the culture's overwhelming
emphasis on holy times and overwhelming de-emphasis of sacred
space.

Relating his understanding of the culture's relative

ranking of space and time, he says:
A special consciousness is required to recognize the
ultimate significance of time. We all live it and are so
close to being identical with it that we fail to notice it.
The world of space surrounds our existence. It is but a
part of living, the rest is time. Things are the shore, the
voyage is in time •... To the spiritual eye space is frozen
time, and all things are petrified events .... The boundless
continuous but vacuous entity which realistically is called
space is not the ultimate form of reality.
(l95l:96-7)4
The doctrines of Chasidism, a (so-called) mystical branch of
JUdaism that flourished in the European Jewish world until the

4Although it would be difficult to find a more passionate or
poetic denunciation of the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical
system, one insider's words cannot stand alone as representative
of the metaphysics of a culture. The danger of the one personone culture approach has been well documented in critiques of
Papa go Woman and We [IJ the Tikopia.
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twentieth century, corroborate the philosophical ruminations of
Heschel.

In the Chasidic view, spirituality and temporality go

hand in hand, contrasted against the tandem of spatiality and
physicality.

The Garden of Eden, for instance, is understood as

initially a world of pure spirit and energy, a place (English
misnomer) existing only within the realm of time.

When the

apple-essence is spiritually consumed, the world transforms
itself into the physical realm, and Adam and Eve are aware of
bodies (space) and nakedness (R. Tanya and other Lurianic
scholars) .
Chasidus not only ranks time/spirit above body/space, but
actually comprehends the mission of the cultural/religious
mandates as a concerted campaign for pure temporality.

Existence

entirely within time is the essence of immanence, of oneness with
God.

The mitzvot (obligations and good deeds) serve to liberate

spiritual sparks inherent in every aspect of the physical world.
The sparks were once whole, flaming oneness, but upon the
transformation to a physical world they were broken into pieces
(objectification) and hidden within klipot (shells or husks) from
which they must be liberated.

Their liberation and eventual

complete reunification (the ultimate goal of the mitzvot), will
result in "flip[ping] all of space into time"(Brand 1987).
The attitude and process required for reunification and world
temporalization are expressed in one term: dvaykut.
The midnight vigils give a final ritual example of the
dominance of time-notions over space-notions in the Jewish
understanding of reality.

At the midpoint of darkness during the

night, senior male members of a household awaken in order to
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study and cry,to cleave to the immanent world, to perform
dvaykut.

Darkness, a negative, physical power, is seen as most

vulnerable at its midpoint, where a seam runs through it.

If it

is 'attacked' then, if one practices dvaykut, recognizes God as
Yotzer (immanent, the world as a spiritual and temporal
manifestation of God), then the spiritual/temporal realm can be
affected.

There is a chance to reunify, to flip space into time,

to "transform darkness," an aspect of the physical world, "into
unity," the ultimate form of the temporal world (Brand 1987).
Understood somewhat more practically (or comprehensibly, at
least), a devout (i.e. culturally valued) Jew understands that
the ultimate form of reality is Yotzer, that the physical world,
although perceived as a fractured, fractious physicality, is in
essence a unity, the spiritual and temporal oneness of God.
Performing the dictates of the culture, the mitzvot, is at once a
process of helping along that unity on an objective level, and of
helping oneself more directly experience the unity of pure
immanence.
So Heschel's understanding of ultimate reality as timebound, his understanding of space as merely a dependent subcategory of time, finds company in traditional Chasidic
understandings and rituals.

And as he himself says, the thing-

lessness of reality also manifested itself in ancient biblical
Hebrew:

(

There is no equivalent for the word 'thing' in biblical
Hebrew. The word 'davar' which in later Hebrew came to
denote thing, means in biblical Hebrew: speech; word;
message; report; tidings; advice; request; promise; decision
sentence; theme, story; saying, utterance; business,
occupation; acts; good deeds; events; way, manner; reason,
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cause; but never 'thing'.

* * *
Dravidian, a language/culture group of southern India and
northern Sri Lanka, shares with biblical Hebrew the absence of a
term for thing.

Tyler (1984:36) states that Dravidian lacks even

"a metaphysical category corresponding to 'thing'."

Dravidian

also makes no distinction between rational thinking and feeling.
The world, which is conceptualized experientially rather than
objectively, can be equally approached through reason or feeling.
Or, more accurately, one cannot divorce reason from feeling, so
the world must be approached with reason and feeling, represented
by one word in each of the Dravidian languages.
The thinking/feeling combination grows directly from the
lack of 'a metaphysical category corresponding to thing'.

As

Tyler points out, the concept of 'thing' enables representation:
one thing represents another thing.

without a world understood

a priori as thing, knowledge and feeling must be one:

an

interaction among parts of a whole, or an interaction among
elements of a process.

Most of Indian philosophy, Tyler shows,

develops from this metaphysical premise:
... [Indian philosophy] derives both the material world and
the means of knowing it from intentionality and desire.
These "feelings" are not irrational sources of subjective
error that rationalism must contest and defeat in the quest
for objective truth, but are instead the very source and
enabling condition for any rationality whatever. What for
SAE is only a disturbing philosophical afterthought in the
form of phenomenology is, in Indian tradition, the starting
point and foundation of philosophy.
(1984:36)

* * *
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If the Dravidian notion of reality seems to preclude
semiotics (the representation of one thing by another,
arbitrarily labeled 'signifier') by denying the metaphysical
category of 'thing', then the Navajo view of reality reverses the
causality usually inherent in semiotics.

For the Navajo, symbol

precedes thing:
The symbol was not created as a means of representing
reality; on the contrary, reality was created or transformed
as a manifestation of symbolic form.
In the Navajo view of
the world. language is not a mirror of reality; reality is a
mirror of language.
(Witherspoon 1977:35)
This view, although radically different from the Hopi, Jewish
and Dravidian views, also contradicts the American REALITY IS A
THING.

To the Navajo, reality is not a thing, reality is a

process of interrelation among symbols, with language the symbol
par excellence.

Human reality, and with it thinghood, are one

possible manifestation of that process.

As Witherspoon states,

the world itself is a "stage of symbolic action" (36) , for the
movements of the things which we see are only the manifestations
of the thoughts and intents of inner forms.

The thoughts and

intents are primary; the externalized physicality secondary.
This world of the primacy of motion can best be glimpsed
with an analysis of the Navajo linguistic system.

Unlike

English, which focuses almost exclusively on nouns, noun
modifiers and noun connectives,
... the Navajo language is dominated by verbs.
There seem to
be few, if any, nouns that are not either passive forms of
verbs or derived from verbal forms.
particles, prefixes,
and postpositions are used primarily as verbal modifiers.
The dominance of verbs in Navajo also corresponds to the
Navajo emphasis on a world in motion.
(48)
The Navajo kinship system parallels this order.
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Mis-

understood by generations of anthropologists because of their
insistence on defining kinship in terms of shared biogenetic
substance (see Schneider 1985), Navajo kinship resides in process:
The emphasis, focus, and literal frames of reference of
Navajo concepts of ke solidarity are found in affective
action, not in static substance.
(Witherspoon 1977:88, my
emphasis)
Just as a Navajo noun is almost always a verb in passive
form, so a second kinship system, kei, is based on the active
system described above ('-i' is simply a marker to indicate
specific case).

This system is indeed based on thingness (number

of relation-bonds apart), but, significantly, it is used only with
complete strangers, and is the subordinate, marked case of the
process-oriented kinship system.
As thing is a marked case of process, so rest is a marked
case of motion:
[T]he principal verb in the Navajo language is the verb "to
go" and not the verb "to be," which is of relatively minor
importance in Navajo. This seems to indicate a cosmos
composed of processes and events, as opposed to a cosmos
composed of facts and things.
(49)
Even in classifying objects at rest, the primary determinant is
motion: objects are categorized (for syntactical purposes) in
terms of ability to move or be moved.
The Navajo conception of reality in terms of motion and
process rather than 'thing' manifests itself in the air/earth
dichotomy described earlier for the American English system.
the analysis in Chapter 2 predicts,

As

'air' is the element most

real for the Navajo:

What is tne source or power of movement? The answer to this
question is air, for air is the only substance or entity in
the Navajo world that has the inherent capacity to move and
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to bear knowledge. Air is the ultimate source of all
knowledge and animation.
(532)
The inner forms of people, the forms for whom this world is but
a 'stage for symbolic action', are the small wind souls (who
cause the fetus to grow and control involuntary processes) and
the instanding wind souls (who control thoughts, speech, and
actions).

Similarly, it is the wind which gives the mountains

power, moves sound and light and moves the clouds which create
water.

Finally, air lets everything live; it is the one element

which living (and hence more real) creatures need most
desperately.
Mythically, as well, air holds the central place for the
Navajos:

First Man and First Woman are known as 'mist people' or

'air people'; wind is the main information-giver, the secretsharer, the guide, the protecting spirit; breath is repeatedly
associated with strength.
In language, kinship, metaphysics and myth, then, the
combination of process, motion and symbol hold a privileged
position over 'thing'.

For the Navajo, reality is definitely NOT

a thing.

* * *
Clearly, then, others, guarding other sheep in other
valleys, have given other answers.

All the world does not

understand reality in terms of thinghood.

continuing duration,

motion, and an experientialist approach to the universe all
receive primary positions in other lands and other cultures.
,

as differently as those cultures construe reality, each places

\
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And

stock in the concepts of process and interaction. 5
Which leads us, by way of India and Arizona, the Polish
shtetl and the desert mesa, back to America.

Does anyone, or any

group, construe reality in terms different from the dominant
THING model?

Where in American culture, if anywhere, does

process play a paramount role?
or action?

Who understands reality as motion

When is experiential ism valued?

To begin to answer

those questions, I'll turn my attention back home, but this time
to those who stand at least a little out of the mainstream:

the

countercultures and subcultures, the deviants, dissenters and
dreamers.

5,Why' these other cultures understand reality in a way (or ways)
so drastically different from America's is a question that could
take at least another hundred pages to answer. yinger (personal
communication) suggests the possibility that cultures which
emphasize an anthropocentric universe "may be those given to
'thingness'," whereas those who see humanity as part of a complex
interdependence are more prone towards a Galilean way of seeing.
Marx, as Yinger pointed out, believed that class played a more
important role than culture in determining epistemologies.
I agree with both Yinger and Marx. Undoubtedly, an
anthropocentric approach tends towards hierarchal ism and
fractiousness, towards a splintering of environmental holism.
Marx's denigration of the bourgeoisie's skewed epistemology
reveals Marx's own process-orientation, but also nicely points
out the prevailing thingishness of the English and German
bourgeoisies's epistemologies of the time. Each answer, though,
yinger's and Marx's, brings with it another 'why'. Why does
anthropomorphism lead to a thing-epistemology? Why does the
bourgeoisie emphasize the same? I don't pretend to be able to
answer either now, but I will note that it seems that the closer
a culture gets to the twentieth century West, the more likely it
is to attach itself to the thing-epistemology. English seems to
have made the switch around the fourteenth century, when 'thing'
stopped meaning assembly, saying, legal process, etc., and
started meaning a signified objects. Modern Hebrew, as I noted
earlier, incorporated in its rebirth a meaning of 'davar' as
thing that its precursor had never contained.
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CHAPTER 4: THE REVOLUTIONARIES
Where to draw the line?

popping up here, there, and

everywhere, that question holds the key to this chapter, and in
many ways to the study as a whole.

Where to draw the line, for

instance, around American culture?

The Navajo proved a storm

cloud before, and the weather is turning wet again.
line--like a border around reality.

Drawing a

As I cut and carve the flow

of the world that is, as I pluck bits from the stream, arbitrary
as a child's net, do I wear the hat of bounder or creator?
the cultural cop, putting away the deviants?

Am I

Or am I the waste

disposal engineer, quietly cleaning up the bits and pieces that
don't quite fit into my definition of 'clean'?

Or, finally, am I

the SCUlptor, the creator, defining America as only my mind's eye
can, in the only way I can?
In a curious way, I stand in relation to American culture as
America stands in relation to reality.
reality; I define my America.

America defines its

As the introduction stated, every

definition, every cut-carve, encompasses both bounding and
creating.

Aware of it or not, no artist is not also an enforcer,

no enforcer not also an artist.
But can I admit all this and remain a scientist, even an
interpretive one?

I counter with the all-too-obvious:

not admit this and remain a scientist?

how can I

That I present, in these

mere seventy pages, anything more than a brief sampling of what
America is, anything more than a brief sampling of American
epistemology, anything more than a brief sampling, even, of
American epistemology as I see it and as it bears on issues of

reification and process, is ludicrous.
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I have cut and carved, I

know it, and I drag it out for you to see.
Is this portrait selective, then?
omitting, important parts of America?
question:
reality?

Am I missing, or
To answer, I pose another

Is America missing, or omitting, important parts of
If Gehlen, Plessner, Geertz, Berger, Bateson and the

rest of the gang (see introduction) are right , no.

There is no

fountain of truth, no Reality sitting somewhere beyond our
conceptual reach, laughing at our ineptitude, no all-encompassing
union of Local Truths that gleams brighter than the sum of local
flames.
To assume that I omit or miss, we must assume an American
culture somewhere "out there", an objective, existing, almost
tangible thing (that word!) waiting to be discovered.

A

Newtonian Sleeping Beauty dreaming of that ultimate, unbiased,
perfect frame-of-reference observer to chart her beauties.
But we live in Einstein's time.

There are no more

privileged observers, no stationary points of reference.

America

moves relative to me and you, I move relative to you and America,
you move relative to America and me, and my explanation of
America's spacetime is America as I see it.
honest portrait than the one I see.

And there is no more

We are all living on

accelerated frames, to continue the analogy, and there is no
braking, no way to stop for a moment, rest on the wings of the
ether and see the world the way it really is.
Every analysis is itself an interaction, a mingling of me
and America, a creation of me-America.

I cannot find it without

helping to define it, without being a partner in its creation.

The interaction, reified, I call culture.
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I am like the particle

physicist, defining particles that she knows do not exist outside
of her experiments, the particles that collapse from their
pseudo-existence of wave-particle to join her in a transient
creation, the particles that she uses to build and explain the
self-conscious world of physicist-reality. until I lift the lid
on Schrodinger's box, the cat is alive, dead, and dreaming all at
once.

Only when I measure, when I record, when I analyze, is the

cat's fate sealed.

The cat and I, together, create reality.

There is no reality without me, or at least no reality as we
understand it.

* * *
To open the lid, then.

To draw the line.

American culture begin and end?

Where does

Should I include pictures of

reality that oppose my dominant thing-model, yet flourish within
America's borders?
Yes.

To exclude obvious epistemological challenges to my

dominant model would be to draw a line too harsh for my aesthetic
tastes, to paint a picture not stirring enough, one unlikely to
provoke the visceral tug of pleasure that great art does.
Deviants then.

Challenges.

If I'm right in Chapter 2, if

the thing-model structures Americans's thoughts about reality,
then how can other models challenge?

How can a structured mind

admit dissent?
The answer is that culture (American, to keep in context)
does not so rigidly prevent alternatives as my first two chapters
suggest.

For my analysis to posit a monolithic, monarchical

culture I would need to hearken back to a discredited
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functionalism, at least.

And to deny dissent (in addition to

being too harsh a line to draw around the culture for my tastes)
would be to deny change.

On an epistemological island where the

natives all think alike, who brings changes?1
It is far simpler and more coherent to say that American
culture is not monolithic, that it permits (tolerates? stomachs?)
dissent.

Some anthropologists, among them Mumford and Schneider

(1968:107 et passim), have insisted that ambiguity and opposition
are themselves the key determinants of a culture.

A culture

can't operate without opposition (Yinger [1982], AFC Wallace
[1962], Slater [1971]) and that very opposition provides an
anthropologist with the clues he needs to begin to understand the
culture (Yinger, Turner, Schneider).
But how do I explain these contradictions, other than to
invoke the names of some ancestral figures and rest with a
contented nodding of my head?

The easiest way, no doubt, is to

say, quite solemnly, that the exception proves the rule.

But

Geertz (1975), among others, might object to this common-senseas-science approach.

Alternatively, I could pullout the all-

purpose build-a-wall-between-us-and-them functionalist argument
of "reaffirming collective identity."

But more than Geertz et al

would holler this time, pointing out rightly that members change
groups and ideas flow across the wall. 2
lImperialist boats, of course, the political economy wing of our
field would answer (see Ortner 1984). But when the natives are
American imperialists, the boat has sprung a leak. Who's
"hegemon-izing" us?
2r don't mean to say that this doesn't operate symbolically at
all, just that it's by no means a sufficient explanation.
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So, giving up on common sense and the good old conflict model, I
need to probe deeper--for analogies from other fields (Bateson's
idea 1972), then even deeper, towards the bedrock of
explanations.

J. Milton Yinger, in his analysis of deviance and opposition,
Countercultures, argues that countercultures are in some ways
analogous to biological mutations (1982:285 et passim).

A

species's state remains unchanged over long periods of time, but
the existence of recessive genes in the gene pool makes possible
adaptation to environmental change.

Or, more ecologically

speaking 3 , both the species and the environment outside
of the species contain matched propensities for change:

the

entire context is internally bound together.
Culture and counterculture live together in a manner similar
to species and mutation.

The mutation, or counterculture,

provides a reservoir of alternatives to draw from in times of
major ecological crisis (or 'change', to be less value-laden).
And once again, the cybernetic approach--Yinger cites Gerlach and
Hine (1973:260):
[I]f you're not part of a mutation, you are part of the
environment which selects for or against it. No one can
escape an evolutionary role. (cited in Yinger 1982:288)
Which is simply to put a new twist on an old saying: If you're
not a part of the solution, you're a part of the problem.
Philip Slater provides a similar explanation of what he
calls the "alternatives" to the dominant culture:

3Bateson's term; yinger prefers "field" or "cybernetically".
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These latent alternatives usually persist in some
encapsulated and imprisoned form ("break glass in case of
fire"), such as myths, festivals, or specialized roles.
Fanatics continually try to expunge these circumscribed
contradictions, but when they succeed it is often fatal
to the society. For, as Lewis Mumford once pointed out,
it is the "laxity, corruption, and disorder" in a system
that makes it viable, considering the contradictory needs
that all social systems must satisfy. Such latent
alternatives are priceless treasures and must be carefully
guarded against loss. For a new cultural pattern does not
emerge out of nothing--the seed must already be there.
(Slater 1971:110-11, cited in Yinger 1982:286)
Where Yinger focuses primarily on ideas and social groups that
are at least somewhat conscious of their opposition to the
dominant culture, Slater emphasizes the ritual aspects of the
culture (myths, festivals, social roles) that contradict the
pattern of which they are a part. 4
As we're about to see, this distinction between
institutional and ritual (Yinger and Slater) echoes victor
Turner's distinction between the temporary communitas of ritual
liminality and the more lasting (although less complete)
communitas of institutionalized liminality.

Turner (1969) paints

a picture of the ritual process where the movement towards
communitas (the state of Buber's [1970] "Ich-du"), entails a
passing of the ritual participants over the cracks in the
cultural sidewalk, the interstices of the social structure, the
period of liminality.

Turner delves into a number of cross-

4 Yinger does include Slater in his chapter on social change, and
expands on ritual contradictions in his chapter on symbolic
countercultures. Although the latter chapter sets out a detailed
explanation of the "how's" of internal ritual counterepistemologies, the "why's" are subsumed under the general
"why's" of Yinger's understanding of social change as a sort of
non=lI·'larxist cultural dialectics.
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cultural liminal states and emerges with this (Levi-Straussian)
series of "binary oppositions or discriminations" (1969:106) ,
liminality represented on the left (coincidence?), status system
and structure on the right:

(

Transition/state
Totality/partiality
Homogeneity/heterogeneity
Communitas/structure
Equality/inequality
Anonymity/systems of nomenclature
Absence of property/property
Absence of status/status
Nakedness or uniform clothing/distinctions of clothing
Sexual continence [or community]/[standard]sexuality
Minimization of sex distinctions/maximizations of sex distinctions
Absence of rank/distinctions of rank
Humility/just pride of position
Disregard for personal appearance/care for personal appearance
No distinctions of wealth/distinctions of wealth
Unselfishness/selfishness
Total obedience/obedience only to superior rank
Sacredness/secularity
Sacred instruction/technical knowledge
Silence/speech
Suspension of kinship rights and obligations/kinship rights
and obligations
continuous reference to mystical powers/intermittent
reference to mystical powers
Foolishness/sagacity
Simplicity/complexity [in speech and manners]
Acceptance of pain and suffering/avoidance of pain and
suffering
Heteronomy/degrees of autonomy (Turner 1969:106-07)
To Turner's list I add those other polarities that he mentions
later in the text:
now/past-present-future
speculative/pragmatic
generative of imagery, philosophical/this-worldly
characterized by structurally inferior categories and
groups/preoccupied with status
existential/cognitive
artistic and religious/legal and political 5
5 The reader will no doubt have noticed the similarity between
some of Turner's ritual properties and my own distinction between
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Significantly, many of these attributes are significantly
epistemological rather than social structural per se.
As society increasingly diversifies, Turner sees the
tendency for the ritual stage of liminality and its sidekick
communitas to become institutionalized into the form of
subjugated autochtones, individual societal roles (e.g., court
jester), outsiders/strangers, millenarian movements, or
structurally small nations (1969:108).

Liminality, that is, in

its modern setting becomes marginality or structural inferiority.
But less is sometimes more.

Structural inferiority or

marginality almost always finds itself coupled with a moral and
ritual superiority.

Secular weakness conceals sacred power, and

vice-versa. 6
In all cases of secular weakness/sacred power, the group
continues to promote countercultural values.

Structure-savers,

faced with the closet anarchy of sustained communitas, recognize
its power.

They may construct a series of taboos with which to

handle the de-constructers (M. Douglas 1966, cited in Turner).
The liminals may become polluting to the status-conscious; the
structure-bound may see the structure-less as engulfed in a
cyclone of magic and witchcraft.

They are dangerous, the bound

thing-epistemology and process-epistemology.

More to come.

6Edward Said's name springs to mind here, but at this point I
won't suggest anything more than the possibility that his muchdiscussed "oriental ism" thesis ties into some very powerful
theoretical issues, that other-ness may be one manifestation of
the superior's ascription of liminality in an increasingly global
social structure. Political economists may find a boat after
all.
Polemic may be the harbinger of a more grounded theory.
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sometimes say, to us, to our children, and to society.
Of course the wall is not impassable, as the (preindustrial) ritual process itself shows.

Liminality is one stage

of the process, the passing through from tired structure to
renewed.

The home of communitas, liminality serves as the

structure-bound's retreat, a time to heal the wounds of status
fights and soothe the aching limbs of structure in the calm
waters of the uninhibited I-you.

Turner, that is, assdigns a

separate epistemology to each side of his structurally split
world: liminality brings with it communitas and the I-you;
structure brings with it what I call the 'thing-epistemology', a
ciose neighbor of Buber's I-it.
In Turner's view, modern society preserves the balance of
traditional ritual.

(

As the whole of traditional society has

fractured, groups of marginals have picked up the piece of
traditionalism, and like hermit crabs, made the liminal
stage their home.
[W]ith the increasing specialization of society and culture,
with progressive complexity in the social division of labor,
what was in tribal society a set of transitional qualities
"betwixt and between" defined states of culture and society
has become itself an institutionalized state.
(Turner
1969:107)
And as once the fixed path led from structure to limen and back,
now a free-floating pendulum swings from the extreme of oVerstructure and its epistemology to the extreme of communal anarchy
and its epistemology, centered always on the historic middle
ground of tribal balance:
Exaggeration of structure may well lead to pathological
manifestations of communitas outside or against "the law."
Exaggeration of communitas, in certain religious or
political movements of the leading type, may be speedily
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fOllowed by despotism, overbeaurocratization, or other modes
of structural rigidification.
(1969:129)
society, Turner says, balances precariously between structure and
communitas, between fascism and anarchy, a cultural judge
mediating between the powerful husband and the powerless wife.
Turner leaves a portrait of a fluctuating but ultimately
stable system.

Although he emphasizes the dialectic of structure

(with its accompanying epistemology) and liminality (with its
epistemology), the dependence of each on the other, Turner sees
structure as predominant, communitas as structure's refresher:
In the religion of preindustrial societies, [communitas] is
regarded rather as a means to the end of becoming more fully
involved in the rich manifold of structural role-playing.
In this there is perhaps a greater wisdom .... There is a
mystery of mutual distance, what the poet Rilke called "the
circumspection of human gesture," which is just as humanly
important as the mystery of intimacy. (1969:139)
Turner's dominant-SUbmissive ordering of structure and communitas
leads him to brush off (dismiss? derogate?) Buber's admiration
for communitas-based kibbutzim and kvutzot as well as the works
of Rousseau, Marx, Louis Henry Morgan (1877) and Edmund Leach,
calling them Edenic fantasies.

structure remains predominant, as

it must for society to function in Turner's world. 7
I do not question the necessary predominance of structure in
7If Turner had come from another culture, a different weighting
might have resulted.
The communitas-as-refresher notion, for
instance, may have come from the Christian sunday-day of rest
symbol. Traditional Jewish culture reverses that ranking, saying
structure--the six week days--exists for the sake of communitas-the Sabbath (see Heschel 1951). Secondly, Turner was brought up
"in the orthodox social-structuralist tradition of British
anthropology" (Turner 1969:131), which may have influenced him
towards emphasizing the dominance and wisdom of structure.
Finally, the traditional English emphasis on interpersonal
distance (contrary to America) may have played a role in his
invocation of "the mystery of mutual distance."

the social world.

As Margaret Mead once said,

garbage in utopia?'

'Who takes out the

All collectives eventually develop some

structure, as the kibbutzim show.

And even a culture fixed in the

flames of a process-epistemology exists in a social structural
world, as the Hopi clans and kivas show.

I do take issue,

though, with Turner's quick attatchment between epistemology and
social structural position.

Although his model of steady-state

seems fair and well-documented for questions of social structure,
assigning epistemologies to the same model represents an overbold
step.

He assumes that thing-epistemology always accompanies

structure and that process-epistemology always accompanies
liminality/marginality.

communitas is only for interludes and

inferiors.
His steady state seems an unchangeable field, a marriage
with dominant husband and submissive wife in constant argument.
The wife may sometimes get the upper hand, but over time the
basic power relationship stays constant, and divorce is
impossible.
But we live in an age of liberation.

I don't mean to imply

that communitas (the wife) needs to overtake or separate itself
from the structure epistemOlogy, just that it is possible.

In

contrast, Turner's steady state seems a demarcated field over
which a game may

range, but within whose borders it must be

played.
How then, on this demarcated field, should we deal with the
ethnographic evidence of the last chapter?

Is Hopi culture,

intimate as it is with a process-epistemology, merely an extreme
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swing of a dependable pendulum?

Are Chasidism and the holistic

I-thou that Buber derived from it a momentary lapse of structure?
Are Navajo and Yap (among others), with their emphasis on
affective action and not static substance, simply peregrinations
of the steady state, brief jaunts away from its time-tested and
constant home?
I could answer yes to all of the above.

But why?

Why

assume that culture after culture, historical period after
historical period, manifests only a temporary deviation from the
epistemological norm, an expected occasional over-correction from
a too-ordered precursor?
The theoretical structure has become too harsh, too rigid.
To reinject Yinger (1982) into the equation seems an appropriate
mellowing step.

Process-epistemology (the emphasis on action

over substance, relating over relata, etc.), a way of seeing
similar to Turner's 'communitas', seems to me better represented
in American culture as a recessive gene than one element of a
pendulum swing.

It is the countercultural challenger, certainly,

jabbing at the dominant epistemology and waiting for its underdog
chance.

But we don't need to think of it as permanently

challenging.

A mutation can change the organism (for better or

for worse) and the ecological balance can permanently shift.
When Eohippus became the horse, turf became grass, and although a
return to the Eohippus-turf world is biologically possible, it
isn't automatic.

The challenger can win.

That point bears remembering, for comparative, theoretical,
and political reasons.

The form of a cultural epistemology

(American, to stay in context again) is not permanent, not even
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if that permanency is conceived of in terms of a flux. 8

The

possibility of 'culturogenetic' change, carried in Slater's
"encapsulated" rituals and Yinger's countercultures, exists.
Either one of the two seemingly prevalent epistemological genes-Turner's 'structure'-associated epistemology and 'communitas'associated epistemology (or a gene left unstudied here) can
become a determining factor in ecological change.

* * *

8Although the social structure, of course, may indeed be in such
a steady-state flux.
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Turner's "structure" roughly parallels my notion of the
dominant American thing-epistemology.

The preoccupation with

state, differentiation, nomenclature and money that characterizes
structure brings to mind thingness.

Nomenclature, for instance,

rests firmly on bounding, on cutting and carving, on somewhat
arbitrarily differentiating created 'elements' from the flow; in
other words, it rests firmly on the action that characterizes,
sui generis, the thing-epistemology.

Similarly, thing-

epistemology expects structure's predilection for money and
status:

'real' as a noun meant, among other things" a coin and a

king from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth (OED:200).
The "partiality/totality" dichotomy brings to mind the
distinction between the Hopi's cyclic (whole) time notions and
our own linear aggregate (splintered) notions.

That distinction

returns in Turner's observation of the tendency for liminality to
be existentially rooted in the now and structure to discriminate
among past, present, and future (1969:113).

As Chapter 3 noted,

the Hopi make no use of the concept of a past or future.

Maybe

most strikingly, Turner emphasizes "the close connection that
exists between structure and property"(1969:129).

And what word

survives as the most obvious marker of the reality-as-thing
cultural construction?

"Real estate", the very word for

property, solid land--the opposite of flow and fairies.
Turner's "structure", then, correlates closely with my
"thing-epistemology."

And although I do not accept his dialectic

steady-state, I certainly embrace his "liminal/communitas"
category as one challenger to the dominant epistemology.

In

sifting through the deviants, dissenters, and dreamers, then, it
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will be more than useful to keep Turner's categories in mind as a
sort of geiger counter of cultural opposition and alternatives.
And sifting through the dissenters is what I'm just about to
do.

Having decided to draw my cultural line generously around

them, and having found a way to incorporate them into the
cultural painting without undue clashing (and hopefully with
added subtelty), I now begin the actual execution.
Deciding which dissenters to include isn't easy.

In a

culture as humanly large as ours, dissent pops out from every
foxhole.

I am, for instance, a dissenter, a cultural actor

conscious of epistemologies and holding the desire to change
(subvert?) the dominant model.

But I do not dissent, as an

individual, ex nihilo; I draw my ideas from cultural models

(

(radical academic and theatrical, in my case), communal paradigms
from which I construct my own montage.

An analysis of

individuals, no matter how broad, would tend towards a
philosophical or psychological study.

What I want to observe,

from an anthropological angle, are the group formulations, the
communal symbolic models from which individuals build their
philosophies and psychologies.
It's said that you can find everything in America (another
argument for the wide-line model of drawing the local
epistemology), so even narrowing dissent down to group
epistemological dissent leaves a broad field.

I have chosen the

following four counter-epistemologies, then, for their varying
relationships to the dominant society and epistemology.
Theater represents the closest example of Slater's
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"encapsulated" ritual, an institution/recurring festival rarely
considered even to cohere, let alone to contain or promote an
independent epistemology.

The world of physics, by contrast,

represents a part of society that exists primarily to determine
meaning, an institution into which we have poured the authority
for discovering the way the world really is.

At the other end of

the authority structure stands feminism, a self-conscious attempt
by structural marginals/inferiors to reformulate or expand the
dominant epistemology.

Finally, the 'drug culture', represented

here primarily by Timothy Leary, shows a group of non-liminals,
individuals once favored (value?) by the social structure, who
chose to disenfranchise themselves and radically attack the
dominant society.

(

THEATER
My descriptions of theater's counter-epistemology, its role
as a recessive gene/liminal state/countercultural challenger,
will derive mainly from my own experiences.

Recounted here,

these experiences will constitute the most directly ethnographic
record in the thesis.

I have acted, in everything from

professional Shakespearean repertories to church-basement
community summer companies, with everyone from accomplished
Broadway actors to high school students, for six years.

So

although I may occasionally summon up the names of tribal elders-Stanislavski, Beck, Schechner--I will for the most part relie on
my own memories, on the picture that has developed in my brain of
the unphotographable experiences of the years since 1981.
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Many

of my ideas grow (more like a vine than a tree) from a paper
entitled "The Religious Elements of Theater: From
Autoanthropology to Nomothetics" that I wrote for

Milt Yinger's

seminar in the sociology of religion. 9
Before delineating theater's epistemology, I need to show
the group nature of the enterprise.

An American, even an

American academic, expects to see epistemologies (although she
might not use that word) promulgated by institutions like
religion or deviant groups like the hippies.

She expects a

coherent epistemOlogy from theater the way she expects it from
the auto workers union: not at all.

contrary to politicians,

priests and physicists, actors and auto workers are not supposed
to be enmeshed in a specific way of seeing the world.
One primary reason they're not is that they're not thought
of in terms of a group.

communists, Calvinists, and

Creationists, yes; actors no.

But as I have outlined elsewhere

(1986b), theater clearly holds together as a group.

Subgroups

like Beck and Malina's Living Theater serve as extreme examples
of theatrical unity: members paired sexually (rejecting
marriage), raised children, and conducted economic and political
affairs in an entirely communal manner.

A code of ethics on the

wall of a rehearsal studio at my own Oberlin College insists that

9 The term 'autoanthropology' refers to anthropology done in the
home culture, the use of anthropological method to better
understand ourselves (whoever 'ourselves' may be in each
particular case). Schneider (1968) and Ortiz, among others,
introduced the practice in the 60's. Its importance was brought
home for me by a class that Vern Carroll taught in
anthropological theory.
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no actor ever negatively represent the theatrical enterprise to
those outside of it.

At the New Jersey Shakespeare Festival,

where I once spent four months, director Paul Barry set dietary
laws, dress codes and language restrictions (the forbiddance of
commercial references and advertisements, for example) and held
regular social events to promote esprit-de-corps.
It could be argued, of course, that such examples show
allegiance primarily to the subgroup and only secondarily (if at
all) to the group as a whole.

My experience in the New York

area belies this claim:
certain microrituals (to contrast them with the macrorituals
that theater performs qua religion in the wider society)
serve to promote group solidarity even among the unemployed.
The audition circuit, for one, gives actors an almost daily
chance to see the same people and reaffirm their commitment
to the enterprise; certain occupations, such as waitering
(especially for catering companies) and word processing are
actor-heavy, and certain firms hire solely or primarily
actors, mainly through advertisements in the theater trade
magazine, Backstage; the Off-Off Broadway complex, a series
of unpaid showcases serves as a stepping stone for many
unemployed actors; finally, superstitions (such as not
saying 'Macbeth' aloud, not wearing green) and language
(theater lingo) further strengthen group solidarity.
(1986b:10-11)
But the most potent of unifiers and the clearest example of
theater's group nature remains the actual poiesis of the
macrorituals themselves--rehearsals and performances.

Describing

his experiences with the postmodern theater of Richard Schechner
and others, victor Turner relates:
It involves innumerable workshop sessions, some lasting for
hours, others all night, in which breathing exercises, voice
workshops, ingenious games, psycho-dramas, dancing, aspects
of yoga •.• represent components. All these disciplines and
ordeals are aimed at generating communitas or something like
it in the group.
(1982:119)
Turner's experience doesn't stand alone.
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In Between Theater and

Anthropology, Schechner identifies six essential "points of
contact" between
the theatrical method and significant anthropological
observations concerning ritual: Transformation of Being
and/or Consciousness; Intensity of Performance; AudiencePerformer Interactions; The Whole Performance Sequence;
Transmission of Performance Knowledge; How Performances are
Generated and Evaluated.
(Freiman 1986c:3, based on
Schechner 1985:6)
Following Turner and Schechner, then, theater stands clearly as a
group, and one tending towards liminality and communitas.

But

before matching up the theater and Turner's (unexplained) Gestalt
of liminal characteristics, I want to demonstrate theater's
fundamental process-orientation.
Postmodern American theater divides process from product,
the growing from the plant.

Process represents the flow of the

rehearsal period (itself almost always referred to as the
rehearsal process)--the developing, the flowing, the creating;
product represents that flow frozen over--developed characters,
creation complete.

And most importantly, process is emphasized.

Characters can only become 'real'

(and that is the word used),

actors and directors insist, if the actor immerses himself in the
flow of process.

Any attempt to fashion a character, to focus on

the end product, the final form, ultimately reduces to
presentational, false theater, Stanislavski's "exaggerated false
acting."
Improvisation, a hallmark of American theater from
Vaudeville to Second city, also strongly reinforces the processepistemology.

Without words, without routines, without plot, in

other words without any reified tools, actors must react, immerse
themselves in the doing of acting.
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No possibility for end

product focus, no way to thingify the flow, exists.

As a major

activity of the American rehearsal process as well as an actual
performance (from 'parfournir, OF "to complete", indicating a
still-going-on-process) component or style, improvisation ranks
process as the dominant way of seeing.
Perhaps most importantly, the very method of creating a
character rests fundamentally on an active notion of process,
both in postmodern theater and in American theater in general.
One of the central steps that an actor uses in creating a
character (in addition to improvisation) is the analysis of the
script for a set of character objectives.

Logically extended,

this theory holds that each individual is driven by a set of
intentions.
,{

The actor formulates these expressions in the form

of active desires.
Trofimov in The Cherry Orchard, for instance, might phrase
his objective in the famous "All Russia is our orchard" scene as
"I want to impress Anya."

The actor playing Trofimov would then

strive in the course of the scene to re-act to Anya in terms of
this intention.

Never would he try to play "being sad" or "being

intelligent" or being anything stative.
acting, or creating a
react, not to act.

The essense of good

'real' character, is to do, not to be, to

An actor who tries to play states, nouns, or

adjectives like 'in control' or 'intellectual' or 'happy' dooms
himself to "exaggerated false acting"; an actor who cleaves to
verbs, who plays the scene trying to impress Anya, his focus on
her, will succeed.
This approach emphasizes the relating, the fragile current
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of connection between the actors on stage.

This, it is believed,

more honestly represents the actual people who live their lives
in dynamic flux with others and their environment and not as
static isolates, with reducable, listable characteristics.
The way that actors and directors use 'real' and 'false'
shows how deeply imbedded process-epistemology is in theater.
An actor who devotes herself totally to pursuing her objectives
during a scene, rigidly fixing her attention on the flux, the
process, is considered to have created a 'real' character.

An

actor who, to the contrary, focuses on attributes and emotions,
who makes sure to show her anger and her irk, no matter how
stirring and powerful is still considered to have engaged in
'false' acting.
A process-epistemology focused on action should, like the
!

Navajo, reverse the degree-of-reality ranking of the earth-air
dichotomy.

Theater continues this pattern.

actors are labelled "sprites" and "nymphs".
sUbstitutes for "theatrical inspiration."

certain 'types' of
"The muse" often
certainly none of

these terms refer to tangible, earthbound creatures.

And

ritually, actors cannot rest shoes on the dressing/make-up
tables.

A sociobiologist or fundamental functionalist might yell

"cleanliness control," but as an interpretivist I see a
prohibition that insures the representative of the base earth,
shoes, staying away from the launching pad of the art's reality.
Many outside of theater don't consider theater real
at all, but think of i t as a temporary vacation from reality, a
brief dream-flight away from the gravity-tiring ground.

That may

explain some of the thing-ers air-name calling (see below).
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It

also poses a problem for ascribing epistemology.

Can something

not itself real have a distinctive way of seeing the real?
To answer that question, it's important to return to the
native's point of view (Geertz 1983:55-73).

As I've argued

elsewhere (1986a) from a philosophical perspective, stage
characters are just as real as non-stage ones.

Which is just to

stand Hamlet on his head: all the world's a stage and we are
merely players, backwards.

But whether I'm right or not isn't

important here; the significance rests with the fact that native
theorists (myself among them) have expounded the belief that
theater is real.

And even those who do not hold such radical

ontololgical beliefs (after all, a culture doesn't always agree
with its native philosophers) db believe in the reality of the
rehearsal process--its ability to reveal personal truths, to
create genuine communitas.

The outsiders argument, then, that

theater isn't real, breaks down from the inside. 10

Modern

American theater believes that it is real, and has located that
reality in the world of process.
Before I move into the terrain of physics, I want to show
the fit between American theater's process-epistemology and
Turner's list of liminal attributes.

"Fairy," for example, an

ungrounded creature, is a derogatory term applied to a certain
perceived category of gay men, those often considered effeminate
and "theatrical."

That would be expected by process's general

lOEven if theater is conceived of as play (note the homonym), the
unreal-ascription still holds: play is 'make-believe', i.e., not
real to most Americans.
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reversal of the earth-air dichotomy.
to Turner's model.

But it also ties in closely

"Theater," your average citizen will inform

you, "has a lot more homosexuals than most professions."

That

may be true of not (more men may simply be open about it): if it
is not, then the assumption may be a distance device (taboo?)

to

prevent contact (M. Douglas 1966); if it is true it could relate
to the association of liminals with structural inferiors and
marginals (here women) or with Turner's "minimization of sex
differences."

That in turn may connect with the liminals's

tendency to avoid patterns of structurally 'normal' sexual
relations.

Very few actors, to continue the correlation, get or

stay married.

Which may in its turn go back to the public's

general perception of actors as more orgy-prone than, say,
accountants.

The causality isn't at all clear, but the

correlation is:

actor/liminal as gay/female/unmarried/orgy-

prone; regular American as straight/male/married/orgy-Iess.
unmarried people, especially those engaged in (or perceived
to be engaged in) orgies tend to be more ensemble-oriented.
Actually, the ensemble is one of the clear markers of modern
American theater.

Several of Turner's elements of the liminal

Gestalt click into place under the ensemble-matrix: "equality"
and "absence of status"--all roles are of eqaual significance;
"homogeneity"--any actor can play any part in many ensemble
shows; "communitas"; and "anonymity"--an actor 'gets into
character' and leaves the old idiosyncratic self behind. l1
although I am
110f course, actors aren't actors all the time.
delineating this analysis to the times when they are actors, a
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Leaving the old self behind leads into a second clustering
of liminal attributes: what I call the no-self matrix.
"Unselfishness," the first of the group, manifests itself in
theater through both the ensemble dedication to "the process"
over and above any individual ego and the well-worn saw that "the
show must go on."

Shows going on means people sometimes don't.

At least that was the message forcefully presented to me at the
New Jersey Shakespeare Festival when the director retold a tale
of a past season when a blood-gushing wounded soldier bound his
cut, stepped back into the fray and finished the swordfight and
the show before being rushed to the hospital and sewn up.
"Acceptance of pain and suffering" clearly belongs to the no-self
complex.

Similarly theater not only tolerates but encourages

"foolishness," a necessary attribute of creativity, particularly
during improvisations.

The final link, "total obedience,"

represents one of the more interesting (and politically
important) elements of the anti-structure complex.

The director,

like some Ndembu puberty group supervisor, decides: when the
actor has bled enough, if the show will go on, how foolish to be,
etc.
Absolute power, in turn, relates to "sacredness."

Although

a recounting of evidence about the insiders's beliefs on the
sacredness of the theater is too lengthy for this format, I've
paranthetical point may be in order. Actors, far more than say
accountants, tend to define themselves by profession. The
creation and presentation of self for an actor often rests on the
acting.

69

documented it elsewhere (1986b).

For a taste of it, though, I

quote the following from Julian Beck's The Life of the Theater
(1972#30) :

... the theatre principally is the dancing place of the
people
and therefore the dancing place of the gods who dance
in ecstasy only amid the people
And therefore we aim this theatre at God
and the people
who are the destination of the most holy
holy holy revolution.
with sacredness comes "sacred instruction."
prominent example.

Barry stands as a

He insisted that theater is religion, a

statement that I accepted until I realized he meant it literally.
In a letter he later sent me, Barry asserted that God sent
different prophets to different people at different times and
implied that he and his theater carry God's message to New Jersey
today.

That message, and with it the sacred instruction on how

to pass it along, are hedged about by the ritual circumscriptions
that I noted earlier.

And with both Beck and Barry's assertions

of theatrical sacredness and their methods of sacred instruction
(recall the Oberlin theater's code of ethics prohibiting
revealing anything negative about the art) comes Turner's
"continual reference to mystical powers."

I mentioned the muse

earlier, the avoidance of the mention of Macbeth, and I cite
once more Schechner's (1985) points of contact between ritual and
theater, many of which are suffused throughout with continual
reference to the divine.
Present-tenseness and simplicity represent the final two
striking correlations between Turner's liminal list and the
theater.

"Living in the moment" stands as one of the most
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important of the actor's dicta, a central organizing direction
for emphasizing the need to concentrate on the relating mentioned
above.

The opposite of living in the moment, thinking of a part

of the scene to come, the lines about to be said, the way the
last five minutes went, etc., is the path straight to false
acting, theater's greatest taboo.
mandated.

Similarly, simplicity is

While constructing the objectives (see above) an actor

strives to use simple (generaly one or two syllable) verbs that
relate directly to the other actor(s) on stage or to the
environment.

Any attempt to over-intellectualize the character's

motivations, including to attempt to fix those motivations in
memories or aspirations (past or future), is also believed to
lead to false acting.

Which doesn't mean an actor doesn't take

character history into account while discovering the motivations,
just that once the simple one-line one-verb one-object
motivations are discovered every effort is made to play them "in
the moment."

A fact that once again hearkens back to Hopi, to

the no-tense world of process, to the anti-thing camp.

And in

this battalion (although not in the Hopi's one) to anti-structure
and institutionalized liminality.

* * *

,

,
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PHYSICS
If theater represents institutionalized liminality, the
ritual stage encased in modernity's lamination and left
on the mantle, then modern American physics is the laminating
machine running down, modernity entering the postmodern world.
In the centuries since the advent of modernity, western
culture has poured more and more of its epistemological duties
into the mouth of science.

It has been argued that Newton paved

the way for a godless era, that the ramifications of the
integrated mechanics led to the Great Machine and its at-least
Deist conclusions.

Whether we can accept such a profound

causality is questionable.

But in the hundreds of years since

Newton, physics has substantially increased its prestige-ranking
in the philosophical world.

Scores of books and articles, for

instance, have been written on the effects of quantum theory and
relativity to the worlds of philosophy, psychology, information
theory, and even literary theory (see Meyerson, Capek, Stapp).
Harold Puthoff and Russell Targ of the Stanford Research
Institute have even attempted to apply quantum theories to such
occult fields as telepathy and remote viewing.
As physics has come to be regarded as one of the
epistemological inquirers par excellence, it has also internally
solidified.

Regardless of the flow to and from the outside

culture, physics has through the years fashioned an increasingly
self-consistent symbolic world.

Although it might be going too

far to assert that physics now represents a culture separate from
its host, its autonomy is marked.
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Several occurences on the modern scene make this clear.

For

one, much of modern science occurs in an international setting,
across nations and continents, cultures and culture groups.
Although national styles of focus and emphasis may differ
drastically (see Vucinich), an integrated whole clearly exists.
Academia has not been ignorant of this trend.

Although

mainstream sociology and anthropology have for the most part
regrettably neglected the study of science, separate departments
in the history, sociology and philosophy of science have sprung
up at a number of universities.

The university of Pennsylvania,

a leader in the field, now publishes a regular journal devoted to
the history and sociology of science, Isis.
All of which is not surprising. Although Kuhn did not use
the word, he clearly analyzed the manner in which distinct

(

subcultures can and do appear through science.

As a paradigm

develops in a field, the scientists become less likely to write
for a general public and more likely to write in a way that will
only be understood within their group.

The symbol system

expands, but only extends to those within the narrow confines of
the paradigm.
But although this 'culturality' may not be surprising, it
could be troubling.

Not troubling because of its distance from

the host culture; as I have noted above discourse continues to
flow strongly, particularly in the epistemological arena.

But if

modern physics represents something of an internal international
subculture, then how can I analyze its epistemological
relationship vis-a-vis America?
The notion of national styles that I mentioned above
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provides the beginning of an answer.

Modern physics as a

discipline and a quasi-separate cultural world may be available
to everyone from a Vietnamese fisherman to a Tallensi farmer, but
significantly, very few of them ever do choose to take it up.
outside of a small group of 'western' nations composed of the
United states, Britain, west Germany, France and a few others,
physicists are few and far between.

Furthermore, those few

Tallensi or vietnamese who do choose to become physicists almost
always attend schools located in that small group of western
countries, beginning the process of acculturation both inside and
outside the physics labs.
But to say that modern physics resides in the western world
is not to prove its distinctive Americanness as regards
epistemology.

That is a proof I cannot give.

As a somewhat

detatched subculture developed in the international cauldron of a
few western nations, physics remains more autonomous than most of
the subcultures with which the dominant American culture
interacts.
As I remarked in an earlier footnote, the distinction
between American epistemology and some broader culture group
(whether i t be the generic 'western culture', MacCannell's
'modern culture', Whorf's 'SAE', or the linguists's 'IndoEuropean') is itself a difficult distinction to.make.

Obviously,

many similarities exist between America and Britain, America and
Germany, even America and France, and those similarities may
include elements of a shared epistemology.

Nevertheless, as I am

confined by limitations of knowledge, resources, time and space,
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I have chosen to focus on the culture which for me is most
accessible, the one I know best.

For that reason my units of

analysis derive mainly from America, although an occasional
citation from the Oxford English Dictionary may muddle the
picture.
If that problem holds for American epistemology in general,
it particularly holds for the world of physics.

Which is not to

say that I've given up on detailing a specifically American
subculture of physics when it comes to the interaction between
the dominant thing-epistemology and quantum physics.

In the last

thirty years quantum physics, and particularly the philosophical
elucidations of quantum physics by physicists, has come to be
more of a strongly American enterprise.

This may be explained by

institutional structure, resources, and so on, but even if that
is true the connection between culture and institutional strength
represents an important subfield of the sociology of science that
cannot so easily be dismissed.
Furthermore, those quantum physicists who have recently
come from outside the United states often come from two of the
nations most closely related, etymologically and politically,
with us:

Great Britain and west Germany.

The epistemological

link between these three countries may be more than incidental:
as once the German language helped give birth to English by
crossing the Channel, so German scientists of the twentienth
century (many of whom eventually came to live in this country)
helped give birth to quantum physics by crossing the Atlantic.
In the pages that are to follow, I'll focus mainly on the
American children of those 'western'
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(or 'modern' or 'SAE' or

whatever) parents, the scientists of the Lawrence Berkeley Lab,
Georgia Tech, the Institute for Advanced study, and other centers
of the particularly American modern physics.

And it is those

very physicists, the Americans, whose contributions represent
some of the most exciting (in American terms) epistemological
work of this century inside or out or physics.

* * *
The geography of quantum physics's epistemology is dotted
with concepts seemingly foreign in the realm of science-mysterious cities of nothingness, plains of process, valleys of
holism and forests of experientialism--landmarks that would seem
more fitting on an LSD trip or in the philosophical world of a
Mahayana Buddhist.
It seems as if I've already left that land, already
abandoned the insider's point of view.

Just by breaking up

quantum physics's epistemology into pieces like 'nothingness' and
'process', I've negated the very holism around which much of
quantum physics hovers, the idea that no thing exists
independently, that all of the universe patterns, that it is one.
But in another way I've found the land, adopted the native's
practices as my own, for although physicists may yearn to finally
prove that unbroken unity, they speak along the way of mesons and
positrons, the weak force and the sixth dimension.

Those very

unreal (their term) constructs, the things which do not in any
way truly exist, themselves provide the path to holism.

In much

the same way, .I hope my unfair constructs, the buckets into which
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I've sorted my knowledge, provide the path to quantum physics's
unsortable epistemology.

* * *
"Commonsense contradictions are at the heart of the new
physics," says Gary Zukav, author of a recent novice's guide
to the field.

That's not surprising.

In fact, it means we're on

the right track towards a counter-epistemology.

Common sense, as

Geertz has shown, provides the last-ditch defense of cultural
values, the system into which the very basics are poured (see
also Yinger 1982).

To counter common sense, then, as modern

physics does, counters culture.

The mutation is in the pool.

If anyone feature of this new mutation stands out among the
rest, if any seems to organize them all, that feature is
nothingness.

Henry stapp of the Lawrence Berkeley Lab has

put it clearly:
If the attitude of quantum mechanics is correct, in the
strong sense that a description of the substructure
underlying experience more complete than the one it provides
is not possible, then there is no sUbstantive physical world
in the usual sense of this term.
(stapp n.d., cited in
Zukav 1979: 105)
As stapp's quote shows, nothingness has a sidekick, namely
experiential ism.
stapp himself does not believe that quantum mechanics's
descriptions are ultimately complete.

That completeness theorem,

the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics led by Niels
Bohr, states that quantum mechanics measures our experiences, not
some observable "out there" beyond our reach.

Probabilities and

aggregates are physics's domain, the interpretation holds, not
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absolute explanations of individual events. 12

stapp, rejecting

that hypothesis, believes that models of reality are possible.
He believes in superluminal connections, in the relativistically
impossible transfer of knowledge faster than the speed of light,
in the implications that holds of a universal organicism, an allpervading unity.
Which all sounds very mystical.

And very confusing.

But at

its heart, the stapp-Copenhagen dispute represents a simple
debate fought over a simply startling question:

Is the universe

founded on fundamental nothingness, or is it ultimately of one
piece, a God-like supercreature communicating with itself?
Although much of America would prefer it, modern physics
does not provide a "none of the above" answer.

only two choices

exist, both of which provide radical challenges to the dominant
(

American thing-epistemology: nothingness and superunity.13
12 The Copenhagen here provides an interesting parallel with Henry
James's American pragmatism. James held that the mind deals with
ideas, that it can't ponder reality itself, just ideas about
reality.
In his view, truth is the match-up to experience, not
to some absolute reality.
Lakoff and Johnson would emphatically agree. So, it seems, would
neurophysiology, which posits that the brain receives signals
from nerves, never actually experiencing any element of reality
directly.
13Actually, two other options are given, both of which occupy
extremely marginal positions in modern physics. The first, the
Many Worlds Theory, posits that every time more than one
possibility exists and only one occurs, the others actually occur
in alternate universes.
In the Schrodinger's cat example, for
instance, the cat both dies and lives, even after the
experimenter's observation.
If the observer sees a living cat,
the cat died in another universe, etc. The second position,
superdeterminism, holds that each interaction occurs exactly as
it must; there is no choice, no probability, no anything except a
blind, ultimate, predestined fate.
Both of these theories are
built around the assumptions that l)models of reality are
possible (contra the Copenhagen interpretation), and 2)locality
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Nothingness, no-thing-ness, suffuses many areas of modern
quantum physics.

Modern Big Bang theory, for instance, put

forward by Alan Guth (then of Stanford), postulates that the
universe was born out of nothingness.

Not some infinitely

massive, compact pinhead of matter as was once believed, but nothing-ness:
[T]he whole system of the world--space, time, matter--all
seem to have sprung into existence from nothing. "I have
often heard it said that there is no such thing as free
lunch. It now appears possible that the universe itself is
a free lunch," said Alan Guth, the creator of the
inflationary theory. The universe indeed seems to have come
from the vacuum; i.e., from nothing.
(Szamosi 1986: 248)
Inflationary theory holds that a false vacuum (a vacuum somewhere
above the lowest energy state) repulsed itself, causing a
superluminal expansion of spacetime which increased the energy in
the universe.
true vacuum.

After expanding, the universe settled down to a
Nothing was excited, it burped, the universe was

born, and then nothing relaxed.
Which is almost exactly analogous to another part of quantum
physics, particle interactions.

Just as the nothing emitted the

universe and then relaxed to a lower energy state, so an electron
emits a photon and drops to a lower energy level.

But the

electron itself was born of the same nothingness that the photon
was.

Quantum electrodynamics (S-Matrix theory in particular)

holds (there are discrete parts of the universe, contra Stapp),
so that both conclude that contra factual definiteness fails.
Although the first of these (the Everett-Graham-Wheeler
hypothesis) is occasionally discussed in physics, the second is
more often considered metaphysical.
(Zukav 1979:320)
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holds that particles themselves are merely "intermediate steps
in a network of interactions" (Zukav 1979: 266).

Feynman vacuum

drawings, the product of American physicist Richard Feynman,
describe interactions in the following way:
[Wlhere there was no-thing, suddenly, in a flash of
spontaneous existence, there are three particles which
vanish without a trace.
(Zukav 1979:257)
Nothing gives something, which returns to being nothing.
This no-thing-ness central to quantum physics has its root
with other elements of the new physics, particularly relativity.
Einstein's great E=mc 2 showed, epistemologically, that no
essential distinction exists between energy (process) and matter
(thing).

Particle mass, for instance, is now measured in terms

of electron volts, an energy measure.

Thing is understood in

terms of process, a situation reminiscent of the Navajo
epistemology's inactive as marked state of the active.
is paramount.

Process

As Zukav puts it, mass is "energy of being."

Two final examples of physics's essential no-thing-ness
should hammer the point home.

First, particle spin, one of the

essential determinants of a particle's identity, involves "The
idea of a spin without the existence of something spinning ... "
(Born 1951:206, cited in Zukav 1979:227).

Second, the

electromagnetic force 14 , which is understood at least partially as
a wave, is itself irreducible.

It doesn't wave through anything;

it just waves (Zukav 1979:151-156).

The way particle spin spins

without spinning, electromagnetic waves wave without waving.

14 More properly, the electroweak force, which is one of the three
basic (i.e., as yet undeconstructed) forces of the universe.
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spinning and waving are what matters, not what spins or waves.
If the proof of physics's preoccupation with nothingness
seems to have led to a discussion of the paramounce of process,
good.

That's where we're going next.

turns out, have never been seen.
microscope.

Subatomic particles, as it

Not even by an electron

Like rabbits after the first snow, the only evidence

we have of them are the tracks they leave behind.

Their effects

on photographic plates, their remnants of action, point the way.
This reliance on action-not-object for the proof of physics's
most fundamental theories reveals just how deeply process is
embedded in the field's epistemology.

Spinning, waving, and

tracking.
The evidence continues to pile up.

Particle physicists

refer to particle-smashing experiments as "resonance hunting"
experiments, since particles are understood primarily as
resonances--interactions of energy fields (Cole 1987:24).

As

Zukav puts it:
If there is any ultimate stuff of the universe, it is
pure energy, but subatomic particles are not "made of"
energy, they ~ energy .•.. Subatomic interactions,
therefore, are interactions of energy with energy. At the
subatomic level there is no longer a clear distinction
between what is and what happens, between the actor and the
action.
(1979:212)
Finkelstein's (Georgia) theory of quantum topology takes the
current state of particle understanding and pushes it to its
radical-process end:
[Tlhe basic unit of the universe is an event. or a process.
These events link in certain ways (allowed transitions) to
form webs. The webs in turn join to form larger webs.
Farther up the laaaer of organization are coherent
superpositions of different webs.
(Zukav 1979: 295,
my emphasis)
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string theory (or superstring, as it is sometimes called) pushes
Finkelstein even farther, by tying both the particle and the
cosmological ends of quantum physics together.

Edward witten

of the Institute for Advanced study in Princeton, the principal
proponent of the theory,
strings.

holds that the universe is composed of

Not strings as in kites or cheese, but unobservable

mathematical curves.

Some 'fundamental stuff' makes up those

curves, and that 'stuff' is generally considered to be spacetime.
Empty space and empty time.

Nothing.

No-thing-ness.

And those

loops of nothingness vibrate, that is, engage in an ongoing
process, to create the ongoing illusion of things.

Calling the

illusory particles "points [of interaction]", K.C. Cole describes
superstring this way:

(

[S]tring theory is proposing that these points, in fact, are
tiny loops, or closed "strings," .... The strings, too,
vibrate invisibly in subtle resonances. These vibrations,
so the theory goes, make up everything in the universe.
Imagine a closed string--a loop--of some kind of
fundamental stuff. Now imagine that the loop rotates,
twists and vibrates ..•. As the loop wriggles, it resonates
in many different modes, like a 10-dimensional violin string
sending out cosmic versions of A or E flat. These
vibrations ... determine all the possible particles and forces
of the universe.
(1987:22-23)
Witten, obviously, has pushed far beyond the Copenhagen
interpretation's assertion that no models of reality are
possible.

He represents in many ways the fallout of Bell's

theorem, a 1964 mathematical proof that either the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics are incorrect or the principle
of local causes fails.

When the Clauser-Freedman experiment

(Berkeley) verified beyond a doubt the correctness of quantum
mechanics's statistical predictions, the house fell through.
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If

you assume models of reality are possible (contra Copenhagen),
then local causes must fail. 15
Jack Sarfatti in 1975 proposed that the universe is
connected intimately with itself, in a way that transcends both
space and time.

The universe connects with itself, Sarfatti

theorized, by a "superluminal transfer of negentropy
(information) without signals" (Zukav 1979:310).

In this theory,

no thing moves; "Nonetheless, there is an 'instantaneous' change
in the quality (coherent structure) of the energy in both
areas ... " (IBID).
Sarfatti's radical theory of superunity, although not widely
accepted, follows rather directly from much of the legacy of
quantum physics.

Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, for

instance, originally showed that either the momentum or the
position of a particle, but not both, can be determined by an
experiment.

Heisenberg essentially destroyed the old concept of

'observer'.

The scientist in some way 'creates' the world, since

her interaction affects results: she chooses whether to find a
particle with position or a particle with momentum.

Discovery

after discovery, theory after theory later verified this radical
epistemological switch. 16

This led to a myriad of metaphysical

15Zakov: "The principle of local causes says that what happens in
one area does not depend upon variables subject to the control of
an experimenter in a distant space-like separated area. The
principle of local causes is common sense. The results of an
experiment in a place distant and space-like separated from us
should not depend on what we decide to do or not to do right
here"(1979:304).
16Zakov believes that our dominant American epistemology asserts
the fundamental separateness of objects and events. This, he
holds, represents part of our sense of separateness from others
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questions:
May the universe in some strange sense be 'brought into
being' by the participation of those who participate? .. The
vital act is the act of participation.
'Participator' is
the incontrovertible new concept given by quantum mechanics.
It strikes down the term 'observer' of classical theory, the
man who stands safely behind the thick glass wall and
watches what goes on without taking part. It can't be
done, quantum mechanics says.
(Wheeler et aI, cited in
Zakov 1979:54)
Such speculations, represented above by a prominent Princeton
physicist, led to questions about the process of 'studying'.

A

particle's isolation, its separateness from the universal
environment, itself is a physicist-created idealization.

One

significant viewpoint derived from that fact holds that
quantum mechanics allows us to idealize a
fundamental unbroken unity so that we can
fact, a 'photon' seems to become isolated
fundamental unbroken unity because we are
(Zukav 1979:95)

photon from the
study it. In
from the
studying it.

Sarfatti created his superholism theory from this important
tradition, physics's central epistemological tenet of an
interactive, holistic, self-creating universe.

In the final analysis, I must pour the analytic buckets back
into the pool, put Humpty-Dumpty back together again.

Pushing

him off the wall, breaking modern physics's epistemology into
parts, represented the arbitrary act, the act contrary to the
insiders's own epistemology.

But just as they separate

and from the environment of which we are a part. His belief
melds well with the picture of a thing-bound dominant American
epistemology that fixes itself in a world of separate objects.
The theory also produces interesting ramifications when combined
with Bellah et aI, Bateson, and Lakoff and Johnson.
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'particles' from the fundamental unbroken unity so that they can
study it, I separate (and so in some way create) elements of a
prevailing counterepistemology so that I can study it, and in a
particularly physics-like twist, its interaction with the
dominant American epistemology of thinghood.

As they dream of a

simple mathematical expression to describe the fundamental
unbroken unity, the essential no-thing-ness, I dream of a single
simple sentence that could convey the world of no-thing, holism,
experiential ism, process and reality-creation that is modern
physics.

We'll both have to wait.

* * *
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FEMINISM
If physics stands as a shining example of a mainstream group
awarded the authority to make profound epistemological inquiries,
then feminism represents the other side: the marginals, never
thought worthy to entertain philosophical thoughts, demanding the
right and authority to make their particular epistemological
views heard.

Physics was the good old boys gone bad, feminism

isn't good, old, or boys.

Just, according to the thing-

epistemology, bad.
To call this section an inquiry into the epistemological
beliefs of feminism is a misnomer.

Feminism is a blanket term,

covering everything from support for equal wages to the espousal
of radical pedagogic techniques.

Unlike theater and physics, no

schools. exist to pass on the paradigm, no structural system
sustains its members. 1

Which should, in and of itself, intrigue.

The first two examples in this chapter have been structure-bound
groups, theater as an encapsulated ritual, physics as an actually
mainstream structural group promulgating subversive epistemological beliefs.

But feminism, structureless, represents

the first liminal on Turner's model, a group of people .excluded
from the social structure.
But more than Turner's model of a knee-jerk opposition to
the structure it is excluded from, feminism provides an example

IFeminists do involve themselves in structure in many ways,
particularly politico-legal structures and institutionalized
academic structures. Nevertheless the determining feature of
their involvement is their marginality, their opposition to the
structure and its patriarchal epistemological biases.

of one of the first conscious counter-epistemologies in the
modern era.

Aware of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis (although not

necessarilly accepting it in toto), feminism has made bold
attempts to reformulate language, both syntactically and
semantically.

Similarly, aware of the modernist and

postmodernist debates over form and function, feminism has
realized the hidden transferral of values implicit in classic
pedagogy and set out to reform those teaching methods.
Although ignoring political, legal, and minority aspects of
feminism is to paint a skewed picture, I do not aim to paint at
all.

It is not an isolate, feminism, which I hope to portray,

but rather a relationship, the interaction between feminism's
self-conscious epistemology (or rather parts of feminism's selfconscious epistemology) and the dominant American (male) model.
(

For this reason, I will focus on those self-aware theorizers, the
pedagogues and linguists. 2
Idealized pedagogical methods of feminist theory differ
2It is essential to realize that these theories are not always
generally accepted, either in the structure world as a whole or
even inside the feminist discourse. The epistemological
explanations of aesthetics and generalized writing styles are by
no means unquestioned. Nor are the suggestions for a new
aesthetic made or inferred by Penelope and Wolf, Stein, Millet,
donovan, etc. always followed.
But for the purposes of this study, these facts are not
important. As a self-conscious self-creating epistemology,
feminism's conscious creations are important, particularly the
attempts to create and identify a distinctive way of seeing the
world. Whether what these writers say is generizable to women as
a whole proves insignificant in an analysis of feminist
epistemology.
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radically from standard classroom tecnique.

The rotating chair,

for instance, is to the socratic method what Thomas Jefferson's
dream is to King George.

Instead of a single teacher controlling

the agenda and deciding who may and may not speak, each member
(student or teacher) chooses the next speaker, and the agenda is
shaped collectively rather than hierarchically.
Feminism's emphasis on interdisciplinary studies represents
another attack on the structurtally standard ways of academia.
Institutions, it is believed, and with them the institutionalized
divisions of knowledge into departments and fields, derive from
the patriarchal hegemonic structure and as such help to pass it
along.

Although each discipline or field may have acquired

important knowledge, a student can best acquire that knowledge by
approaching it from an interdisciplinary angle, by standing
outside of the rigid structure.
The emphasis on democratization and standing outside the
structure in feminist pedagogy manifests itself as one of
feminist literary criticism's most potent concerns: the role and
plight of the marginal.

In "Madwoman in the Attic," a classic of

feminist literary theory, Gilbert and Gubar assert the necessity
of paying attention not only to the obviously important Jane
Eyre, but also to the minor characters whose lives have often
been overlooked or brushed aside.

Rosencrantz and Guildenstern

may be dead, but only because we haven't paid much attention to
them.
If feminism demands bringing minor characters back into the
fold, understanding as marginals ourselves that they too have
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been overlooked and ignored, then i t demands also that 'minor'
authors be re-dis-covered.

The canon must be de-canonized.

The

aesthetic endemic to the patrimony must be expanded at least,
perhaps rejected.

Standards must be revolutionized.

Women's

(and other minorities's) miniscule printing history represents
not merely a lack of access to the means of production, but a
fundamentally exclusionary process.

Reinterpreting our

standards, going back over diaries, letters and romance novels
once disparaged and seeing them in a new light, provides one of
the first steps towards revolutionizing the dominant aesthetic
standards.
The advocates of a distinctive women's writing style, like
the literary theorists, begin with the recognition of the
connections between aesthetics, epistemology, and language.

As

Penelope and Wolfe say:
We must wrestle with English in our efforts to remake it as
a language adequate to our conceptual processes. From
Virginia Woolf and Gertrude stein to Kate Millet and Susan
Griffin, the relationship between consciousness and
linguistic choice is confronted, played with, and
articulated as the self expressing itself in and through a
language remade, reordered: the feminist aesthetic.
(1983:135)
Their quote of Josephine Donovan (1975:78) states the matter
consummately:
[A]esthetic judgments are rooted in epistemology: one cannot
understand why someone thinks something is beautiful or
significant until one understands the way slhe sees, knows
the world.
The counter-epistemology that feminist literary theorists
would like to create fits well within Turner's liminal Gestalt.
Gertrude Stein, for example, extols the virtues of the present
tense.

She speaks of the need for a new tense which she calls
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'present immediacy' that she believes should be the foundation
stone for story writing.

Her consciousness of the role of

language and her attempt to reformulate American English in
terms of holism provides an intriguing example of liminal
attributes:
[T]he 'internal history' of a country always affects its use
of writing.
It makes a difference in the expression, in the
vocabulary, even in the handling of grammar .... I had this
conception of the whole paragraph .... I had this idea of the
whole thing ... They conceive of it as pieces put together to
make a whole, and I conceived it as a whole made up of its
parts ... the element of punctuation was very vital. The
comma was just a nuisance.
If you got the thing as a whole
and the comma keeps sticking out, it gets on your nerves;
because, after all, it destroys the reality of the whole.
So I got rid more and more of commas .... That is the
illustration of grammar and parts of speech, as part of the
daily life as we live it.
(1974:153)
If Stein illustrates well the 'totality' aspect of Turner's
liminal state, Maud Haimson represents the anti-bounding bias
expected by a counter-epistemology in my dominant thing-system.
In her short story, "Hands", characters don't have regular, fixed
names.

Instead, their names evolve ecologically, as a part of

the context:
The cave woman picked up a small rock, touched it all
around, and brought it to the older woman. The older
outside woman took it, touched it and holding it asked the
inside woman if she'd been outside. The stone woman shook
her head and taking a look at her stove picked up some rocks
and put them in her many pocketed cloth-like thing going to
the ground, pockets in the back too with bulges from stones.
She followed the other woman out.
(1975:60, cited in
Penelope and Wolfe 1983:127)
And once again antibounding links with experiential ism; as
Penelope and Wolf note,
[W]hat she wears is more than a product, or material object,
or categorized, fixed label .... It has characteristics, but
it too is engaged in the processes connected with its being
and functions. (1983:127)
90

stein believes that the processes of writing must be
included in the writing itself, that a written object isn't an
object, but the record of a process.

Her preference for verbs

and adverbs, like the Navajo and Hopi preference, reveals her
inclination towards the process-epistemology:
In the Making of Americans a long a very long prose
book made up of sentences and paragraphs and the new thing
that was something neither the sentences nor the paragraph
each one alone or in combination had ever done, I said I had
gotten rid of nouns and adjectives as much as possible by
the method of living in adverbs in verbs in pronouns, in
adverbial clauses written or implied and in conjunctions.
(cited in Penelope and Wolf 1983:129)
Verbs of action, conjunctions of interaction make up her world,
not nouns of stasis.
Kate Millet also strives for that world of interaction:
[Hler life overflows the narrow, restrictive syntactic
boundaries of the conventional sentence that is 'a complete
thought,' bcause there are no 'complete thoughts', as our
moments touCh moments in other lives, as the places of
touching are not 'places' but interfaces from which other
possibilities come into being with their own touchings
beyond our own.
(P&W, 130)
since they've been my source for the literary criticism
sUbsection of this epistemological analysis of feminism, I'll
give Penelope and Wolf the wrap-up:
The natural imagery of growth, proliferation, and evolution
replaces nature as object and product. Flux is the only
experience; stasis is impossible. Labels and abstract nouns
as viable perceptive categories give way to active, process
verbs....
(1983:137)

DRUG CULTURE
The Lesson of Water
What one values in the game-lS the play
Fluid
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What one values in the form-is the moment of forming
Fluid
What one values in the house-is the moment of dwelling
Fluid
What one values in the heart-is the beat
Pulsing
What one values in the action-is the timing
Fluid
Indeed
Because you flow like water
You can neither win nor lose
Timothy Leary, VI-5 from Psychedelic Prayers After the Tao Te Ching
In the drug culture's world, air and water overpower earth.
water flows, preferring process, and air allows flight.

Both

strongly oppose the earthbound thingness of the dominant American
epistemology.
process.

Drug language, like poetry and water, prefers

The same verb-preference observed in Navajo, feminism,

theater, and Hopi repeats itself here:
on', to engage in process.

to take drugs is to 'turn

To Timothy Leary, the process is

paramount; even if during the course of a trip some state of
consciousness seems particularly appealing, Leary emphatically
declares the need to continue with the process:

"Consciousness

could flick in and out of any imaginable happy/horror chamber.
The trick was not to get caught, not to freeze the flow of
reality" (1983:66).
Language of journeying a:ccompanies language of process.
'Launching off', for instance, means to take psychedelic
mushrooms (psilocybin).

Leary speaks of having "shared voyages"
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(1983:65) with people, which means taking drugs with them.
An 'inner explorer' is a person who uses psychedelic drugs.
When you're on drugs, you 'trip', another journey-word.
The journey-imagery is closely associated with air-imagery.
'I'm high' is a sUbstitute for 'I'm tripping', and 'high as a
kite' is another.
is 'flying'.

A third expression used for the same purpose

The three metaphorical systems, process, journey

and air, remain intimately bound.
These drug expressions do not at all resemble expressions
used for states of consciousness induced by alcohol, narcotics
or downers.

Words such as 'wasted' connote an association with

garbage, which usually resides on the ground.

'Fucked-up'

similarly brings to mind extreme physicality, coming as it does
from the root fokken, to strike hard with a stick, and meaning
now to have violent or meaningless sex.

'Plastered' also carries

associations with physicality, particularly with walls, prime
examples of bounding.

'Trashed' and 'shitfaced' hearken back to

'wasted' and an association of excrement and garbage.
'smashed',

Finally,

'bombed', and 'blasted' all produce images of a

destroyed thing.
Leary and the drug culture not only use process-language,
but advocate communitas.

His work at a prison while he was still

a professor at Harvard reveals his emphasis :
It seemed that two major factors were bringing about changes
in the convicts: first, the perception of new realities
helped them recognize that they had alternatives beyond the
cops and robbers game; then, the empathetic bonding of group
members helped them sustain their choice of a new life.
(83:89)
Leary's summer research institute in Mexico attempted a
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communitas-based community; he called the people there
'utopiates' and used the same word to refer to the psychedelic
drugs. Summing up, he said: "The six weeks at Zihuatanejo had
given us a glimpse of utopia" (83:143).

Turner's observation that

liminals often attempt to create utopias seems applicable here.
"Within a few days we realized that we were developing the
Ultimate-destination resort.

Hotel Nirvana .... "

Similar

examples of communitas in the drug culture include the Big House
Leary set up in Millbrook, a place where everyone could
come and be equal, and Ken Kesey and his traveling bus.
Woodstock, among others festivals, springs to mind as an
epitomizing example of much of the drug culture's communitasbased epistemology.
(

opposition to personal property, as we would expect, goes
hand-in-hand with communitas. The examples of Kesey's bus and
Leary's Big House are clear.

Leary says "if your concept of

'real estate' is neurological rather than mammalian, then your
habitat defines your launching pad."

This statement may seem

somewhat packed, but seen in the light of his clear preference
for neurological over mammalian (which he perceives as
territorial, property-oriented), Leary seems to be advocating
that we define our reality in neurological and not thingbound
terms.

If you follow a self-created reality, he believes, you

have a launching pad from which you can journey through the air,
away from this bounded territorial mammalian earth ground of
structure and property.
Leary's belief in the creatability of reality derives from
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his experience with LSD.

During a part of the tripper's

experience, she is entirely able to re-imprint herself, to
prepare an altered reality for herself for the time when she
emerges from the trip. "consciousness," he says, "is energy
received by structure" (1966) which sounds very similar to
Turner's notion of communitas as a structure-refresher.
that Leary draws radically different conclusions:

Except

he sees the

liminal stage as a way to change, not just reaffirm the old
structure, to re-im-print, not just re-in-vigorate.

For Leary,

the liminal stage is more than structure's refreshments stand.
After a good trip, Leary says, "Your old reality fades a bit, and
you incorporate a new reality" (1983:87).

For Leary that's

what change is all about, a new creating, not a steady state
pendulum determining our kneejerk reactions to the last era.
I'll let Leary have the last words here:
I have remained unenthusiastic about pious teachers who set
up schools, hierarchies, and special rituals •.. [We should]
avoid secrecy, beaurocracy, masters, followers, dogma, and
fixed ritual ••. make accessible to everyone what had for
centuries been shrouded in occultism.
(83:150)

* * *
In the final analysis theater comes closest to an example of
Turner's liminal model.

The elements of sacredness, the present-

tenseness, the emphasis on simplicity, the total obedience, the
no-self complex and the communitas-inspired ensemble seem to
slide in toto from Turner's list of liminal attributes into the
repertory of modern, institutionalized liminals doing on a
societal level what the ritual stage once did on an individual
level: reversing, refreshing, questioning.
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The only tight spot in the otherwise perfect fit proves to
be theater's (unexpected to Turner) preoccupation with 'creating
reality' on stage, a preoccupation that pops up again in modern
physics.

Creating reality, as Heisenberg, Wheeler et al point

out, is the prime occupation of every physicist.
Furthermore, physics fits into the process-epistemology
model, emphasizing no-thing-ness, process and interactions.

But

instead of being the expected marginal/inferiors, they're the
structural superiors, institutionalized science's top echelon of
epistemological inquirers.

Antibounding this time finds its home

near the top.
And also near the bottom where feminists, whose gender is
often called 'airy',

'flighty', or 'spacey'

(airnames all) soar

into the world of process, recognizing their marginality and
seeking to infuse the dominant culture with their own distinctive
aesthetic and underlying epistemology.

Focusing on wholeness,

communality and present-tenseness, they know all along that they
seek to change the dominant epistemology.
As does the drug culture, whose loud opposition to
structure and property and admiration for communitas was coupled
with a clear cognizance of the liminal re-imprinting process.
That knowledge found expression in the belief in the createdness
of reality, a belief that the drug culture shares with feminism
and physics, Gehlen and Geertz.
The createdness of reality is a crucial point.

If you

create reality, you need not be bound by some previously
demarcated steady state.

Epistemology, that is to say, need not
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always accompany social structure.

If reality is created,

process-epistemology can pop up anywhere: at Princeton in the form
of string theory, at Oberlin with the rotating chair, in the
White House with psilocybin (see Leary 1983).

Turner's model, by

contrast, insists on the unchangable steady-state, the land where
structure determines thing-epistemology and anti-structure
determines process-epistemology.
Looking back, Yinger's model of evolutionary change does
seem far more suited than Turner's steady state pendulum to these
four groups. 3

Each of the four, particularly physics, feminism

and the drug culture, seems something of a mutation, a change on
the symbol-level world of the chromosome.

Whether the mutation's

ultimate success would lead to species extinction or perfection,
to an over-armored dinosaur or an adaptable chameleon, remains
uncertain.
What is certain is that the mutation can change the
organism, create a new symbolic world.
sometimes rules the roost.

Process-epistemology

Navajo preference, like feminsm's,

rests (or doesn't rest) on motion, on the air end and the verb.
Hopi, like the drug culture, flows in process, in the
epistemological system that Turner associates with liminality but
that in more than one culture inhabits the world of the
dominants.

And even when the dominant culture does hold a

radically thingish epistemology, as in America, members of a
3Just a thought: a steady state, a demarcated field--bounded
entities, things. An evolution, an endless evolving--a process,
without bounds. Is my own bias determining my model?
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structurally superior group can hold a process epistemology, as
the American physicists who are currently reformulating the face
of science show.

Each group, then, advocating a slightly

different twist from the dominant thing-epistemology, represents
a unique counter, a distinct mutation fighting to control the
symbolic code of the cultural DNA.
cultural contradiction, opposition, ambiguity: the tools for
digging deeper, for finding out what holds the culture up, say
Schneider, Turner and Yinger.

Following Basso's (1979)

distinction, I'll leave the 'interpretive'

(or symbolic) models

behind and push on into the 'social' models; say arrivaderci to
the 'thick description' of local happenings and begin to search
out the social ambiguities, the use and abuse of 'reality' by the
individuals themselves.
Americans.

In other words:

Goodbye America, Hello

As we'll see, they're more than geographically

connected.
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CHAPTER 5:

riverrun 1

If the last chapter was the game handbook, this one is a
strategist's guide, a showing of the game films to the players
themselves.

No game, no matter how complicated, can be

appreciated or even understood with a knowledge of only the
rules; the strategy, the why's of this feint and that attack,
represents the beauty of the game and holds the conscious
attention of the players.
The rules themselves, of course, do not always form a
seamless whole, a simple mandate of practices for a single
purpose.

Rules evolve in response to various requirements--the

promotion of excitement, for instance, coupled with the
inhibition of violence.

(

Some of the rules are born of the need

to promote that excitement, some out of the need to inhibit that
violence, and bound they may hold together as a coherent system.
Players, brought up under the mediating set of ,rules, may believe
that the game they play is actually a manifestation of one of the
needs, not both:
violence.

one hockey player may emphasize grace, and one

Who chooses what depends on a bookload of variables,

lLiterary/Philosophic footnote:
'riverrun' is the first word of
James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake. The general consensus is that it
is uncapitalized because there really is no beginning; everything
comes in context.
Literature, of course, is itself both a process of bounding
and creating, as Joyce's choice of the uncapitalized first word
shows. Something is always left out. Joyce was an exception.
Most who draw broad distinction between the art/humanities and
the sciences tend to think of the former as essentially creative
and the latter as essentially bounding, i.e., demarcating
significant facts for analysis. But as I have tried to show,
every endeavor must needs contain both. Literature often claims
to be purely creative; chemistry to be purely analytic
(bounding); I hope that anthropology comes to do and admit both.
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everything from town of birth and coaches to individual
personality and role in the game.
And even after you pick your place in the game, or rather
your circumstances and you pick it together, dilemmas pop up.
What if the game interferes with your religion?

What if you

can't stay married and be on the road a hundred and eighty days a
year?

What if you have to sleep with somebody, or get involved

in some shady dealings?

These are the times that try men's

souls.
We are, of course, the players, and the American thingepistemology is our game.

The strategies we use to play by or

around or against the rules come to be somewhat standardized;
since the game remains pretty much the same, many of our tactics
become canonized.
down-and-out?

Whoever heard of playing football without a

But the strategies reflect not only the make-up of

the game; to some extent they also reflect the way we'd like the
game to be.

And just as changes come about in the rules of games

when those very rules come into conflict with other 'games' in
the society, so our strategies can either reflect or reform the
dominant epistemology.

Prohibition isn't always permanent, but

the weight of the law can come down hard.
On then to the strategies: the contextual use and abuse, by
social actors, of our conceptual rules for the thing-reality.

* * *
To me, writing on a computer isn't 'really' writing. To you,
voting socialist isn't a 'real' alternative.
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But a book can come

off a computer and a socialist candidate can collect votes.
Living on a kibbutz isn't a 'real' lifestyle and academia isn't
'the real world', but thousands of people live on kibbutzes and
millions live in academia.
these contexts?

Why then do we use the word 'real' in

Quite simply, we use the word 'real' to define

reality on our terms, to limit the frame of discouse to our size
frame.

If I don't like your haircut, I'll tell you to get a

'real' haircut.

In my reality, contextually defined, your

haircut is so far from the norm that it doesn't deserve to be
called 'haircut'.
A splash of graffitti on the wall of a dormitory at Drew
University illustrates the concept well:
who can't handle drugs."
true.

"Reality is for people

As a tactical shot in this game, that's

People who don't want to 'handle' drugs define them as

outside of reality so that they don't have to handle them.
course it works the other way too:

Of

members of the drug culture,

feeling alienated from the dominant thing ish conception of
reality, redefine reality as something that only an unable nonuser would want anyway.

Tactical shot number two.

But trying to

pull away from either perspective, it becomes clear that a brain
is just as 'real'

(whatever I mean by that) whether chemically-

induced synapses are firing or not.
Advertising provides a rich field for the analysis of social
strategy in the reality game.

Coke, for instance, is 'the real

thing', and by rather pointed implication no other colas are.
Beef is 'real food for real people', which means either other
possible nourishments are so far from food that they don't

101

deserve the label or people who eat them aren't quite people, or
both.

'Real' vanilla is defined by a standards agency as the

specific part of the plant from which vanilla is derived, but
exact chemical duplicates from other parts or other plants must
be labeled 'imitation'.

Milk is defined as the secretion from a

cow's udders plus certain other chemicals, but if different (not
the specified other) chemicals are used a dairy may not use the
insignia 'REAL'.

The same with mayonnaise:

Miracle Whip must

call its product 'salad dressing' because its chemicals are not
in accord with a set of guidelines defining 'real' mayonnaise.
In all of these cases, reality is defined as that which is within
the advertiser or standardizer's interests.

Coke is real and

Pepsi isn't, because Coke decides.
contemporary idioms pave the same path.

(

'Get real' means

get like me; your ideas or actions are straying far enough from
(my) reality that they're nonsense.

Or it means something like

'unreal', which expresses disbelief, but more importantly,
removes the surprising event from the realm of the suprising into
the realm of the unreal and so negates the necessity of
interpreting it.

'It's been real' says what we just had was good

and deep and important.

'Get a real

' as in haircut or job

or meal, defines reality once more on the speaker's terms; the
addressee's haircut or job or proposed meal is not real, and if
she wants to think of herself as being clean, employed and fed,
she'd better get real.

If the idioms I heard when I was a

vegetarian were true in any actual sense, then I spent that part
of my life eating plastic apples and glass eggs, because I was
constantly implored to 'eat something real'.
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Two non-idiomatic forms of the word 'real' work in much the
same way.

'Realize' means to understand--to make real for an

individual; or to get profits--to make potential money into real
money.

Remember a 'real' once meant a king and a coin.

'Really' is used as an intensifier, similarly to 'very' or
'truly'.

Not all languages, of course, intensify by insisting

on actuality.

In America we social strategists say 'really

hungry', but in Hebrew, for instance, you'd say the equivalent of
'hungry hungry', and if you were really really hungry you'd say
hungry hungry hungry.
hungry'

In English English you'd say 'quite

(and maybe 'chap'), quite coming

for 'fixed' or 'quiet'.

from 'quietus,' Latin

Significantly, Americans intensify

descriptions by insisting on their realities.

(

Even the two other

primary intensifiers--'very' and 'truly'--derive from words about
reality.

'Very' comes from the Latin 'veritas' which meant

'truth' and 'truly' comes from the same root in English.
Art and entertainment provide more fodder for the analytic
cannon.
mind:

A line of a poem by Nikki Giovanni springs to
"Because what's real is really real."

In order to affirm

that she can be both an advocate of feminist Black power and an
unabashed fan of men in tight pants, Ms. Giovanni feels compelled
to insist three times (no casual three: as a poet, her words are
preciously chosen) that both her desires are real.

Neither one

is beyond the range of discourse, even though Black feminism
commonly excludes tight pants-lovers and tight pants-lovers
commonly exclude feminists.

Both are real, Giovanni proclaims,

and can be real together.
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Giovanni doesn't stand alone in the art world in defining
reality.

A recent production of an original production here at

Oberlin College contained a monologue on rap music that
emphatically declared that rap is 'real music for real people'.
Reacting to a local environment in which a White conservatory
sets the cultural standards for what constitutes 'real' music, a
Black artist attempted to bring his music and his people back
within the domain of the 'real'.
Recent television's weekly Real People show, although less
stirring, provides an equally pertinent example of artistic
frame-setting:

reacting to a society that harbors at-least

occasional doubts as the the 'real-ness' of television
characters, the network decided not to use trained actors for the
show, and chose to highlight this fact by calling the people
'real'.

An actor might argue that even actors are real people,

but when the network is defining reality, no one's listening.
Direct ethnography (often called 'eavesdropping' in
autoanthropology) provides some of the most direct examples.

A

friend of mind who works in psychological counseling once told me
about a personal emotional trauma that was in the process of
ending her marriage.

After describing the emotional ins and

outs, she responded to a question I asked about future vocational
plans by saying "I've been taking life one day at a time ... I
haven't had time for the real world, real life."

By setting her

own emotional world and the 'real' world in opposition, she
implicitly defined her emotional traumas as unreal.

In so doing,

she lessened the intensity of their impact.
Another friend described the attempts of a clinic she worked
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with to redefine their image:
I had to go out and get ~ real haircut, real clothes. This
clinic has, I guess, a radical lesbian feminist image, so we
dress ... you know, for real ... No Birkenstocks, no beads, no
long hair.
Real haircuts and real clothes are the ones that a radical
lesbian feminist does not wear, a feminist social worker feels
compelled to say, adopting the tactics of the mainstream as her
own.

* * *
Why?

Why do NBC and a radical feminist both argue by

framing discourse, whether that discourse is framed towards or
against them?

The rules of the game are clear, reality is thing,

but why does our culture mandate (suggest? require?) framing a
disagreement by determining the range of discourse.

Coke could

say 'the best thing' as easily as 'the real thing'; you could say
'I don't like quiche' as easily as 'real men don't eat quiche'; I
could say I'm 'quite' hungry.

But we don't.

Instead, we create

(or play with or strategize or define or manipulate) our reality.
The giant 'why' returns to the discussion of the rules of
the game, Chapter 2.

REALITY IS A THING predisposes American

conceptions towards an objectivist account of the universe,
towards the perception of a singular, absolutely true answer to
each question.
A series of single, absolutely true answers makes up one big
single, absolute reality. And an absolute reality admits no
dissent.

If you and I disagree, we can't both be right.

a particle is there or it isn't.
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Either

Theatrical characters are real

or they aren't.

Real estate is territorial or mammalian.

A

woman's name is 'inside woman' or 'cave woman', not both.

A

single reality, made up of a long list of Newtonian knowable
truths, stops arguments in its tracks.

How can you disagree with

what is?

* * *
But American culture and society demands argument.

Our

legal system is based fundamentally on the belief that argument
leads the way to understanding.

Even our most hardened criminals

are given the right to argue their cases, and the attorney who
defends them is not sullied by their crime; to the contrary, a
courtroom defense lawyer remains a hihgly valued position in
,I

American culture.
Similarly, our political system founds itself on the
assumption of the value of vigorous debate.

Not only elections,

but the very system of governing itself works through the
sometimes furious exchange of opinions.

The foundations of our

modern state, the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, strongly assert not only the right, but the
necessity of argument in the creation of a state.

The democratic

tradition and the philosophy of social freedom formulated by
Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries states that all opinions
are valid, that a free and open discourse lies at the heart of a
morally good society.
And those Jefferson-inspired sentiments remain operative
today.

The united States is one of the few nations in the world
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in which both Nazi and Communist parties operate freely.

The

recent nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court was assailed
for, among other reasons, his refusal to support the right of
radical revolutionaries to call for an armed uprising against the
government.

Obviously the freedom of opinion is respected.

Those who do not oppose censorship are those whose
religious subcultures have most strongly cosmos-ized their nomos
(see Berger), those who assert their own rightness and
righteousness as the will of God first and America second.

They

have validated their thing-epistemology as the absolute,
unassailable will of an absolute, unassailable God.
For the rest of us in American culture though, censorship is
seen as a grave wrong.

Whenever we or our press talks about

oppressive regimes in the rest of the world, we cite instances of
(

rigged elections, and significantly, censorship of the press.
The growing admiration of Americans for Mikhail Gorbachev derives
in no small part from his loosing the reins on press control and
political dissidence.

And back home, the Scopes Monkey trial

stands as a hallmark of American culture, having generated books,
movies, and the career of at least one cultural hero.
These two cultural symbols, then, reflect an inherent
tension in American culture.

On the one hand stands objective

truth, REALITY IS A THING, representing the belief in a singular
unassailable truth.

On the other hand stands the notion of open

discourse, the belief in the right and necessity of a pluralist
community of opinions.
So how do we sit on both sides of the fence at once?
the baseball player faced with breaking up:
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It's

how do you tow the

line between career and marriage?

On the one hand, our 'game'

demands a dissent-rebuking singular absolute reality.

On the

other hand, a key cultural symbol, democracy, demands the
opposite.

Which one goes, marriage or job?

Neither, of course.

Our strategy walks the tight rope,

keeps us in good with the wife and the boss.

It is the

manipulation of reality on a day-to-day level that mediates
between these two opposing cultural notions.

The only way to

remove an opinion from the range of discourse without incurring
the negative labelling of 'censor' is to define the opinion as
outside the realm of objective, fixed reality.

I still don't

like your haircut, but I know you as an American have the right
to wear it, so I define it as outside the realm of the
essentialist definition of 'haircut' within the objective
reality.

That way I'm no censor, but the haircut's got to go.

But we have met the enemy and he is us.

To preserve the

fixed, objective reality, to keep playing the game, we adopt the
hallmark tactical move of the process-epistemology, the creation
of reality.

We redefine reality, create a new meaning for quiche

and food and men.
On the level of practice the split epistemologies begin to
merge.

My separate categories blend out of separateness into a

single new structure: the structure of the tactics.

Each

American, faced with the contradictions and ambiguities of a
culture that contains thing and process elements, develops a
coping strategy.

Process-tactics, like creating reality, are

used by thing-ers to maintain the thing-system.
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And thing-

tactics, like the feminist clinic worker's invocation of real
clothes and haircuts, are used by process-ers.

Aristotle uses

Galileo and Galileo uses Aristotle.
This is no simple story of the genius of American
cooptation, no smug smile or sad gaze at Eldredge Cleaver voting
Republican or hearing the Grateful Dead in harmony at the
supermarket.

This is a story of double-effect: of actors from

both sides of the fence sitting on it and taking what they need
from where they need it.
affecting process.

Of process affecting thing and thing

Of the context evolving--the mutation

affecting the organism and the organism affecting the mutation.
Of horse and turf together.

Which could seem to hearken back to

Turner's steady-state model but doesn't, because individuals in
this modern era are confronted by nonstopchange, by inventions,
(

discoveries, immigrants, theories, and technologies. The use of
the old methods to deal with the new

problems doesn't always

work.
As Sahlins has recently said, using traditional strategies
on new (outside) phenomena may not produce the expected results;
the new inventionsdiscoveriesimmigrantstheoriestechnologies may
have their own ways of responding.

Change, then, may result from

the failed attempt to reenforce the game through the use of
traditional strategy (Sahlins 198x in Ortner 198x).

Whites

changed the Sandwich Islanders, the plow changed our ancestors,
the television and the computer are changing us.
So the growing influence of process on thing in our daily
strategies, the tempering of Aristotle with Galileo, may grow
from the new inventionsdiscoveriesimmigrantstheoriestechnologies
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with which we have recently been confronted.

psilocybin, for

instance, seems not to care whether you prefer thing-game
preserving tactics.

Like the plow, it organizes not only social

relations but ways of thinking and seeing the world-epistemologies.

And photons and the electroweak force don't care

if you and I would prefer a clockwork Newtonian world.

We can

try over and over again (and Einstein did) to find ways around
the experiments, to apply our time-tested tactics of thinghood.
But the waves keep waving, and waving through no-thing at that.

* * *
We know the tactics are changing, that individual Americans
are coming to use that distinguishing mark of process, the
creation of reality, as a prime tactic.

(

Idioms with 'real' in

them are very recent phenomena; so are advertisements that tell
us what's real and what isn't.

And even the use of 'really' as

an intensifier, although with us in a minor form since
Shakespeare, has only lately come to be the prime usage. 2
But are the rules changing with the tactics?
being altered?

It seems like the answer is yes.

Is the game
Physics's

apparently 'counter' epistemology comes from the top of the
structure; individual physicists's tactics for adapting to the
new discoveries have led to the transformation of physic's way of
seeing the world.

That in turn has seeped down into biology,

cognitive science and psychology, and even literary theory,
philosophy and art.

Could John Cheever or Northrop Frye have

2See the definition rankings in A.H.D., Webster's, and Q.E.D.
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existed before Einstein?
'Change' has become one of the rallying cries of American
culture.

Not yet as loud as 'truth' or 'objective reality', but

getting louder all the time.

We emphasize the process of

changing, shaking our heads one way or the other at the way they
took down old Uncle Ed's farm and put the condos up.

And we've

even begun to teach change--mandating 'Life cycle' classes as
part of the health curriculum in public high schools,3
emphasizing now those parts of our lives which manifest process.
We have even begun to talk about 'the invention of tradition' in
history, realizing that even what seemed most static--tradition-is itself a part of process.
But I don't want to go too far.

I only want to suggest that

we are beginning to change, to proceed into the world of process,
to recognize the significance of form as well as function.
Postmodernism implicitly recognizes the significance of seeing
both process and thing.

The thing being analyzed, the content,

is generally considered to hold the privileged position in
academia.

But postmodernism attempts to balance thing and

process by saying the form of the analyzing is as imnportant as
what is analyzed.

The telling is as important as what is told.

If I teach you democracy in a dictatorial classroom, I send mixed
messages at best, and at worst undermine the very subject I am
attempting to pass on.

The teaching matters as much as what is

taught, process as much as thing.
Anthropology has not been entirely immune from the general
American drift towards a more evenly balanced epistemological

3 As in New Jersey, for instance, my home state.

system. 4

The classic style of the monograph, for instance, has

come under increasing scrutiny.

victor Turner has pleaded that

anthropology become "something more than a cognitive game played
in our heads and inscribed in--let's face it--somewhat tedious
journals" (1982:101).

Bateson has called for the necessary

reunification of what he calls 'mind' and 'nature'.

Turner has,

even more daringly, advocated a technique for teaching
anthropology that should ring as noticeably process-oriented:
using ethnographies as playscripts.

As he has eloquently and

accurately put it:
I've long thought that teaching and learning anthropology
should be more fun than they are .... Alienated students spend
many tedious hours in library carrels struggling with
accounts of alien lives and even more alien anthropological
theories about the ordering of those lives. Whereas
anthropology should be about, in D.H. Lawrence's phrase,
"man alive" and "woman alive," this living quality
frequently fails to emerge from our pedagogics, perhaps, to
cite Lawrence again, because our "analysis presupposes a
corpse.
(82:89)
Or, as e.e. cummings puts it, "knowledge/ is deadbutnotburied
imagination."

Analysis does presuppose a corpse.

The shell of a

human once the life has left, a corpse is the perfect metaphor
for a thing without process.

Imagination, creativity: these are

the life-force, the process complement to the thinglike body.
Our anthropological writing has so consistently drawn its
inspiration from the thing (analytic bounding) tradition that it
has neglected the artistic (creative) process epistemology.

But

as America changes, as our epistemology begins to mirror our
4Although the self-consciousness one would expect to accompany
the drift has been noticeably absent.
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practice-level juggling act of thing and process, our writing
begins to appear to us as more and more of a rigid structure, an
incomplete picture.

Counting chickens and analyzing kinship

isn't enough anymore; we want creation--a portrait of a culture's
lifeblood, or at least a good read.

The telling is beginning to

be recognized alongside the what-is-told.
But our literary rigidness engenders more than bored
anthropologists.

Our traditional literary genre plugs into one

half of our increasingly dual epistemology: the thing half.

By

aligning our 'telling' with that epistemology, we may alienate
our 'what-is-told'.

Take my section on feminism, for instance.

It represents a classically anthropological approach, an analysis
clearly steeped in traditional writing style.

(

As such, I tied

myself strongly into the thing-epistemology, into the analytic
bounding and structure.
But is that fair to feminism?

Have I stepped outside of the

insider's point of view and taken refuge in my own conventions
and traditions?

Geertz's revolutionary call for understanding

from the native's point of view builds from an assumption that we
can most readily comprehend a culture through its own categories,
that their way of making sense out of the world is far more
likely to be revealed by their internal orderings than by our
external, imposed orderings.

By relegating feminism's process-

epistemology to nothing more than an object of study within my
analytic approach and write-up, I have denied them their autonomy
as an epistemological system.

And by denying them their autonomy

I have put on my blinders, relegated them to a less-than-full
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position and myself to a less-than-full understanding.
It has become acceptable to say that our own cultural
rUbrics do not necessarily apply cross-culturally, that
'religion' might not be a useful device for describing Chinese
civilization and that 'kinship' might not help in Yap.

As

schneider has shown (1985), the use of our rubrics to analyze
others may teach us more about ourselves than others, although we
may continue to think we're learning about the others.

More

recently, Charles Briggs (1986) has shown that as we come to
accept Schneider's tenets, our hegemonic theories have been
pushed underground into the realm of methodology.

Our ways of

finding out about alien cultures reflect "our theories of
communication and of social reality" (p.120).

Our reliance on

those local, folk categories, he says,
acts as a hidden filter, blocking our ability to hear what
'they' are saying while allowing the comforting sound of our
own preconceptions about language and life to be echoed in
our data.
(p.125)
As long as we continue to assume the universality of our cultural
categories or folk methodologies we are doomed to never
understand others as they understand themselves.
In the end, it's our desire to extend our own relevance that
snaps back on us.

As Geertz has said:

To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening.
To see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the
merest decency.
But it is from the far more difficult
achievement of seeing ourselves amongst others, as a local
example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case
among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of
mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and
tolerance a sham, comes.
(1983:16)
Schneider's critique has only begun to be seriously heeded.
Briggs's still echoes unheard, a challenge ringing from the far114

away land of sociolinguistics.

While Briggs's challenge travels

at the speed of sound across that great divide, I'll offer
another from my even more distant place.

Not only do our

analytic rubrics and ethnographic methods often cast a filter
between us and our object:

our very method of communicating with

ourselves inside academia distorts whatever it is we may have
seen through those filtered rubrics and methods.

By writing in a

static, analytic style we impose an epistemology that may be
alien to the very people we study.
Penelope and Wolf, for instance, the major source for my
analysis of literary feminism, themselves regret the necessity of
writing in a style that alienates some of the very women they are
trying to reach.

The alienation will contine, they say,

As long as there is a 'prestige dialect' that everyone
aspiring to status is expected to acquire, and as long as
publishers, editors, and reviewers sanction only those works
written in the prestige dialect....
(1983:138n)
Their understanding of the links between language and
epistemology (detailed earlier) renders their statement powerful:
they are expected to adjust to the dominant epistemology before
they are taken seriously.
I have been complicit, from a different angle, in their
cooptation.

I have tried to understand feminist epistemology in

an epistemology alien to the very one I study.

Like imposing

biogenetic kinship on the Yap or referential-content interviewing
on Mexicanos, I have constructed a wall of my own assumptions
between myself and my subject.
Schneider showed that the assumption that kinship deals with
human reproduction has clouded our understanding of Yap.
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Briggs

showed that the assumption that interviewing is a culturallyneutral device has led to misunderstanding Mexicano culture.

Now

I point out that the assumption that journal and monograph
writing should follow a distinctive style "modeled rather
abjectly on those of the natural sciences" (Turner 1983:89) has
led to our misunderstanding those cultures or subcultures that
eschew a thing-epistemology.
Or even, as I have shown, supplement a thing-epistemology
with a process-epistemology, such as ours.
seem more 'alive'

Wouldn't anthropology

(Lawrence via Turner) if our writing embodied

both halfs of our way of seeing the world?

As much as we have

come to alienate and marginalize others by assuming an extended
importance for our folk beliefs and traditional ways, we have
come to alienate ourselves by focusing on only half of our own
beliefs and ways.

If we grow to learn the utility of both, we

may be less likely to misunderstand and alienate others, and more
likely to understand and enjoy ourselves.

* * *
Such a proposal by no means exceeds the range of the
possible.

We have within our communicative repertoire a number

of methods that do not exclude process, and some which even
highlight it.

Turner's suggestion for a performative

anthropology, for instance, might allow us to portray and
comprehend more process-oriented and liminal groups than the
current journal style.

Annual meetings of mixed paper

presentations and play performances might provide a more humanly
fulfilling experience than the current meetings.
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similarly,

journals which encourage creative, playful prose or even
ethnographic poetry might produce a more balanced understanding
of others and a greater sense of completeness for ourselves.

And

all of this might have the added attraction of bringing our
theories and journals back within the grasp of the layperson,
who seems to have been arbitrarily excluded by a mUltiplying web
of abstruse terms and dry prose. 5
Such suggestions are of course only preliminary, pre-liminary, before we enter the liminal structureless stage of
reformulating ourselves.

As we know by now, that stage is the

imagery-generator, the brainstorming session in which to renew or
change the structure.

It seems most appropriate that only by

going beyond the pre-limin-ary stage, only by boldly stepping
forth into the life-and-death of the liminal, can we enter the
watershed era of ideas, the time when we will create new forms to
express both elements of our epistemology.
This paper, then, only points the way towards that day.

It

is process--the pointing--as much as it is product--the paper.
If I have not yet followed the dual form of writing that I
advocate, I can only echo Penelope and Wolf, to say for now that
I must work at least within earshot of the 'prestige dialect',
the prestige epistemology.

within that earshot, though, I have

done what I could to keep audible both halfs of our epistemology,
5 To the argument that we can't expect our senior anthropologists
to don costumes and wade through poetry, I can only respond by
saying that 'real anthropologists don't mind a bumpy road'.
Anthropology has always cherished that versatile, rough-and-ready
image among academics, and a little physical theater and
spiritual poetry would only add an eccentric twist to the Indiana
Jones image.
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to balance system with practice, steady state with change,
playful prose with standard analytic writing, in order to present
the American epistemology from the insider's point of view.
Because I am an insider, an individual acting on the level
of practice. I am the cultural actor, using both halfs of the
dual epistemology--thing and process--in a strategic attempt to
define my reality of America.

As one native to another, I'll

conclude on a familiar note.

This paper, my strategic attempt,

is a thing, certainly.
discrete object.

You hold it in your hands, a bounded

But it is also a process, a first step in

understanding ourselves, in journeying towards America.
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APPENDIX

The following represents an example of the matchedepistemology writing style that I advocate. ' I t is important to
note that I do not call for a transformation of all
anthropological writing, merely that which attempts to describe
cultures or subcultures with epistemologies radically different
from our own. The following section on the drug culture, for
instance, would stand side-by-side with the standard analytic
style used in Chapter 2. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed
explanation of why I propose this, and how I feel it would
improve in one fell sweep the anthropological enterprise's
understanding and enjoyment, as well as contribute to current
trends in de-imperializing our methodologies and theories.
This section can be compared against the more conventional
section included in the body of Chapter 4.

(

DRUG CULTURE 1

The Lesson of Water
What one values in the game-is the play
Fluid
What one values in the form-is the moment of forming
Fluid
What one values in the house-is the moment of dwelling
Fluid
What one values in the heart-is the beat
Pulsing
IThere are contrarytowhatyoumightthink no spacing problems or
typos in this section.
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What one values in the action-is the timing
Fluid

(

Indeed
Because you flow like water
You can neither win nor lose
Timothy Leary, VI-5 from Psychedelic Prayers After the Tao Te Ching
Air and water overpower earth.
air allows flight.

Water flows, process proceeds,

Drug language like poetry prefers process.

"[W]e all launched off" (Leary [after L] 1983:65) means we took
mushrooms together means we added psilocybin to ourselves.
"shared voyages" (IBID) means we took drugs with.

We

We turn on;

Leary was the first "to turn on Robert Lowell" (L 83:67) which
means he gave him shrooms.
journey.

We verb, always action process like a

"Ralph turned out to be a natural inner explorer"

(83:85) Leary said, flashing back.

He turned out to be a natural

inner explorer, but we turn Qn, tune in, drop out says Leary,
always process always turning tuning dropping never really there.
Flowing is water and flying is air.
journey and air, never ground.

We get high and we trip,

I'm flying I say which means I'm

more than high which means I'm not on or concerned with this
thinglike structure ground.

sometimes I'm even high as a kite.

And when I'm flying I might be tripping too, always a journey but
an air or waterflow journey.
This is not like drinking.

When I drink I'm wasted which is

thingarbage usually on the ground

or fucked-up which means

etymologically to strike hard with a stick fokken and now means
to have violent or meaningless sex a very physical act
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or I'm

plastered very house propertylike on a wall something bounding
or I'm shit faced which is waste on my face which is the ground
and nogood
once a thing.

or I'm smashed which means I'm in pieces and was
Which is all very different from airjourneying.

Airjourneying is very flow like the poem before and a little
like this writing and maybe Timothy Leary says it best again when
he talks about making sure the process never stops even when
consciousness seems really good

"Consciousness could flick in

and out of any imaginable happy/horror chamber.

The trick was

not to get caught, not to freeze the flow of reality" (1983:66
who cares when or where).
that

And in another time place Leary said

"Psychedelic poetry, like all psychedelic art, is crucially

concerned with flow" (1966:no page numbers in this book read the
whole thing not just a quote).

(

The whole thing (I know you read the parentheses) like
communitas like Turner like holism like what my friend said
taking drugs is he said "holism--a dismantling of the
bifurcation" and Leary tried to make holism-communitas.

Like at

a prison where he worked when he was with Harvard still he said
he needed to unbound to make communitas to dismantle the
bifurcation like my friend said to see beyond the arbitrary way
of seeing we have
It seemed that two major factors were bringing about changes
in the convicts: first, the perception of new realities
helped them recognize that they had alternatives beyond the
cops and robbers game [look that's unboundingj; then, the
empathetic bonding of group members helped them sustain
their choice of a new life [look that's communitasj. (83:89)
And other places Leary aimed for communitas like the giant summer
research institute camp he made in Mexico
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"The six weeks at

Zihuatanejo had given us a glimpse of utopia" (83:143) and Turner
said that liminals often findcreate utopias at least in their
minds

which is where Leary wants it to be anyway and he even

calls the group down there in Mexico 'utopiates' and also calls
the psychedelic (not heroindownerscocainealcohol) drugs the same
word 'utopiates'

and he also said that down in Zihuatenejo 1963

"Within a few days we realized that we were developing the
ultimate-destination resort.

Hotel Nirvana .... "

which reminds

the reader who is looking for communitas of the Big House he
later set up in Millbrook which was a place where everyone could
come and be equal and flow and no one owned any property there
because property like Turner says is structure and they
weren't like that up there at Millbrook and neither was Ken Kesey
and his West coast very different communitas gang that lived for
a long time in a bus
that

and Leary talking about Millbrook says

"if your concept of 'real estate' is neurological rather

than mammalian, then your habitat defines your launching pad"
which is pretty complicated but he prefers neurological to
mammalian which he thinks is territorial
real is in real estate I think

and knows the word

so means defining your reality

in neurological not thingbound terms and if you do your reality
neurologically then you have a launching pad which means you can
fly journey and get away from this bounded territorial mammalian
earth ground of structureproperty
which he thinks you can do because he thinks you can create
your reality

but not all the time just sometimes, inbetween the

normal periods of earthbound existence

when you take

psychedelic drugs and give yourself the ability to reimprint
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yourself
are you listening victor? to reimprint yourself even
though you'll go back to the world of imprinted reality and he
says "Consciousness is energy received by structure" in the book
with no page numbers (1966) and I think he means when you're
flying you're off the ground you're liminal

but it's not just

a rest stop for structure it's a way to change it Victor, it's a
way to re-im-print not just re-in-vigor-ate, a way to change the
words not just make the old ones strong again
because like quantum physics and some theater people and
feminists Leary believes that you can create reality just like
Berger and Bateson and Geertz and the gang imply and sometimes
even say
and if you can create reality then the liminal stage is more
than a refreshments stand

it's an idea land

a vacation where

you learn something not just rest up for work again

it's like

the Jewish Sabbath a time that you learn from and live for and
hope to bring some of into the world of structure which you enter
again
that's what the liminal stage is if you're Timothy Leary or
a member of the League for Spiritual Discovery
"It always works this way after a good trip.

and like he says

Your old reality'

fades a bit, and you incorporate a new reality" (83:87).

Which

is what change is about, not a steadystate pendulum determining
our kneejerk reactions to the last era

says Leary and physics

et al
and maybe just maybe the native's point of view is sometimes
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a little deeper than we'd like it to be

(

native is our culture's own counter

especially if the

and that depth of theirs is

digging right under the very ground we stand on

thing.

and finally (where I put it) Timothy Leary makes very clear
how he fits right into that whole Turner liminal Gestalt
(although he disagrees (and so do I) radically about the
implications of that on actual cultural social epistemological
change) by knocking structure and closed morality and status and
inequality (Turner's terms all) as he does here in his section's
last words which he deserves
I have remained unenthusiastic about pious teachers who set
up schools, hierarchies, and special rituals ... [We should]
avoid secrecy, beaurocracy, masters, followers, dogma, and
fixed ritual ... make accessible to everyone what had for
centuries been shrouded in occultism.
(83:150)

* * *
and this isn't a part of Leary's drug chapter so I kept my word,
it's just a little note that I think deserves more than a foot or
to be booted to the bottom, or kicked around, etc.
and that note is that I think the section on the drug culture had
more to say than the section on feminism and I think a lot of that
had to do with form and postmodernism is not dead.

which is to

say that Geertz is not dead because function here is to relate
insider'S form and the best way to do that may be to follow
insider's form

By trying both I allow the reader to choose, to follow the
process of this paper instead of automatically assuming that it
is a bounded, completed thing.
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I offer the process of revision

rather than the revised product, which in and of itself
represents a very feminist offer.

And I democratize style:

that

is, I write in more than one way, and denigrate none of them,
another trick in the feminist book.

'Epistemology' may be my

next word, or 'fly journey', because to provide less of a choice
would be to cast this entire analysis in the plaster of a single
epistemology.
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